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ABSTRACT
This article argues that Delaware corporate law permits shareholders
to use bylaws to circumscribe the managerial authority of the board
of directors. While shareholders cannot mandate action by the board,
they can enact specific prohibitions on its behavior, so long as the
board retains enough discretion to implement—in practice, not
merely in theory—its managerial policies by other means. The use of
such circumscribing bylaws to discourage shirking (or analogous
managerial abuses) by the directors or officers resembles the use of
negative covenants in debt contracts that seek to prevent the debtor
from squandering assets. Bylaw governance thus subtly but
significantly reallocates governance power within the corporation, so
as to reduce the agency costs of management. Its legal validity
should also prompt courts and scholars alike to focus less on the
quantity of power wielded by the shareholders, and more on the
ways that power can be configured to produce managerial
efficiencies.
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INTRODUCTION
Shareholder bylaw power under Delaware corporate law has long
been ill-defined. Section 109(b) of the Delaware General Corporate Law
(“DGCL”) states, rather unhelpfully, that almost any shareholderenacted bylaw is valid if it is not “inconsistent with law.” It also says
nothing about what consistency with law means. It can be inferred that
bylaws must respect the basic corporate principle of separated
ownership and control. Indeed, it is widely accepted that bylaws cannot
validly arrogate for shareholders the power to manage the business and
affairs of the corporation, as that authority is granted exclusively to the
board of directors.1 At the same time, shareholders must be able to do
something meaningful with their expressly non-derogable and expansive
power to enact bylaws that “relat[e] to the business of the corporation,
the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers
of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.”2
This article represents the first comprehensive analysis of
shareholder bylaws since the landmark Delaware Supreme Court (“the
Court”3) opinion in CA, Inc. v. AFSCME.4 It shows that shareholders’
inalienable power to amend corporate bylaws gives them the ability to
enact what might be called circumscribing bylaws—that is, provisions
that place substantive limits on the board’s decision-making without
narrowing the scope of the directors’ managerial authority over
corporate policy and action. Circumscribing bylaws cannot force
decisions on the board; they can prohibit ways of implementing the

1. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV & Bradley Faris, Second Generation By-Laws:
Post-Quickturn Alternatives, 56 BUS. LAW. 1323, 1326 (2001) (noting that bylaws that
“conflict with the board’s authority under section 141(a) . . . to manage the business and
affairs of the corporation” are likely invalid); Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Just Say Never?”
Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren
Buffett, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511, 546-47 (1997) (noting that the validity of bylaws are
restricted the grant of managerial authority to the board under § 141(a)).
2. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b).
3. This Article does not refer to the U.S. Supreme Court, so this shorthand form is
available for other use.
4. 953 A.2d 227 (2008).
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board’s judgment. The argument here is necessarily predictive in nature,
as the Delaware courts have not expressly set forth a coherent
framework for evaluating the legality of bylaws. Still, the
circumscribing bylaw theory reconciles what otherwise appears to be a
bewildering morass of inconsistent and sometimes incoherent cases—in
particular, the convoluted5 CA opinion and the important but similarly
opaque Chancery Court case of UniSuper, Ltd v. News Corp.6 Moreover,
the 2014 opinion in ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund appears to
be moving the law in this direction.7
This Article also addresses the implications of the shareholders’
power to enact circumscribing bylaws, and how traditional corporate
governance becomes supplemented by what might be called bylaw
governance (“BG”). In particular, circumscribing bylaws provide
shareholders with a conduit of direct authority useful for taking action
against managerial ‘shirking.’8 The conduit must be narrow and it must
leave control of the firm in the hands of the directors, who are the actors
best-positioned to make sound business decisions.9 Shareholders are
5. Even Justice Jacobs admitted, in a talk at Harvard Law School, that the CA
opinion he authored was not “necessarily the best way [the case] could have been
handled.” In part, the rushed procedural posture of the case negatively impacted the
clarity of the resulting opinion. In Justice Jacobs’ words, “if we had more than two
weeks and were not under the pressure of time . . . we might have been able to write
[the opinion] better.” What the Court produced was not necessarily “the best way it
could have been handled.” For documentation of Jacobs’ remarks, see Sabrina Ursaner,
Keeping “Fiduciary Outs” Out of Shareholder-Proposed Bylaws: An Analysis of CA,
Inc. v. AFSCME, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 479, 507-08 (2010).
6. No. 1699-N, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 205 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2005). As explained
infra note 17, there are actually two UniSuper opinions: the original opinion in the case,
and a subsequent opinion certifying the legal issues for interlocutory review. As it
happened, the second opinion substantially revised the holding of the first, which has
generally inhibited a clear understanding of the case holding.
7. 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014).
8. In this Article, ‘shirking’ is used as a term of art to refer to the pursuit of
personal wealth or happiness by managers or directors at the expense of the companies
they govern and/or the investors in those companies. Some scholars prefer a narrower,
more traditional usage of the word ‘shirking’ to mean the substitution of leisure for
work, but broad usage is hardly uncommon. See, e.g., Stephen A. Bainbridge,
Corporation Law and Economics 35-36 (2002) (defining “shirking” to “include any
action by a member of a production team that diverges from the interests of the team as
a whole . . . [including] not only culpable cheating, but also negligence, oversight,
incapacity, and even honest mistakes”).
9. See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder
Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561 (2006) (collecting a number of persuasive arguments
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simply not well-positioned to take an active role in company
management,10 and any governance system that confers on them the
power to override the board’s considered opinion invites “waste and
disruption.”11 However, shareholders might be better situated to detect
destructive decision-making processes and inefficient governance
practices than the board,12 and they certainly have more incentive to
curtail opportunism or rent-seeking by insiders. Circumscribing bylaws
gives shareholders just enough direct influence over management to
curtail such abuses, while preserving the large universe of functionally
substitutable13 policy options from which the board can choose at its
discretion.
Part I establishes the statutory foundation and normative
desirability of bylaw governance. It specifies what it means for a
shareholder-enacted bylaw to circumscribe, but not compromise, the
board’s discretion, and explains that the validity of such bylaws is
implied by § 109 of the DGCL. It then sets forth the principal normative
argument: BG can reduce certain types of agency costs that are
against governance proposals that give shareholders greater power over corporate
management). Perhaps the best argument against shareholder involvement is that
shareholders should not want to manage the firm, since most know relatively little
about the business and are not professional executives.
10. For an argument that shareholders cannot efficiently formulate corporate
policy, see Stephen Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53
UCLA L. REV. 601, 608-10 (2006) (describing the “inefficiency of multiple
constituency” decision-making). See also Brent H. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws,
Shareholder Nominations, and Poison Pills, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 205, 237 (2005)
(noting that very few people would disagree that “in a public corporation . . . it makes
no sense for shareholders to engage in ordinary decision making”).
11. See Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93
VA. L. REV. 733, 743-44 (May 2007) (arguing that increases in shareholder voting
powers will exact large costs “in corporate dollars wasted” on proxy contests and
“perpetual management distraction”).
12. Professors Brachton and Wachter observe that a shareholder-based agency
model of the corporation sends management a simple instruction: “in all circumstances,
manage to maximize the market price of the stock. And that is exactly what managers
of some critical financial firms did . . . while fail[ing] to factor in concomitant increases
in risk that went largely unobserved.” See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter,
The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 658-59 (2010).
This is but one illustration of the danger that can arise when shareholders’ interests are
represented only indirectly in the governance process.
13. “Functionally substitutable” is a rough approximation of the actual standard,
explained in more detail in Part I.A.
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generally unaffected by equity or incentive-based compensation, and
can do so less intrusively than conventional shareholder-oriented
governance systems. BG asks courts and scholars not to think of
corporate governance as a zero-sum game in which power transferred to
shareholders necessarily comes at the expense of the board, or vice
versa. The quantity of power allocated to each group is far less
important than the quality of that power. Because the board’s power
over corporate decision-making is nearly infinite,14 it will never be
compromised by a handful of targeted restrictions. It can be redirected
toward more efficient mechanisms of effectuating the board’s business
judgments.
Part II develops the central positive argument in favor of BG,
which is that the enforceability of circumscribing bylaws is implied by
Delaware case law. CA established that shareholder-enacted bylaws are
valid when they pass a two-prong test: (1) they must be within the
“scope or reach” of the shareholders’ bylaw power, and (2) they must
not impermissibly intrude upon the managerial authority granted to the
board by § 141(a).15 The opinion, however, provides only a confusing
and sometimes incoherent account of what these two prongs mean.16 It
makes the most sense when considered in light of the distinction
between circumscribing and controlling bylaws. To say that a bylaw is
within the “scope or reach” of the shareholders’ bylaw power is to say
that it has a circumscribing purpose—i.e. that it does not seek to
mandate board action. To say that it is consistent with § 141(a) is to say
that it also has a circumscribing effect. This distinction between
circumscribing and controlling bylaws also animates other important
decisions that address the proper allocation of authority between the
shareholders and the board.17
14. That is, the number of business decisions available to the board at any given
time or on any given issue is, for all practical purposes, without limit. For instance, the
CEO can be replaced by one of potentially thousands of candidates; the assets of the
company can be organized, sold, or augmented in countless ways; the firm can enter or
exit any number of markets or sub-markets, and so on.
15. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 232 (Del. 2008).
16. In his talk at Harvard Law School, Justice Jacobs admitted that the procedural
posture of the case influenced (in a negative way) the Court’s exposition of the issues.
See supra note 5.
17. Other than CA, the greatest attention is given to Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus.,
501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985), Quickturn Design Sys. v. Mentor Graphics, Inc., 721 A.2d
1281 (Del. 1998), and the pair of decisions in the case of UniSuper, Ltd v. News Corp.,
No. 1699-N, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 205 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2005), and No. 1699-N,
2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 2006).
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I. BYLAW GOVERNANCE: AN OVERVIEW
As used here, the phrase bylaw governance (“BG”) describes a
variant of the prevailing Delaware corporate governance model18 in
which shareholders may exert authority over corporate affairs by
promulgating bylaws that circumscribe the board’s exercise of its
authority. Such bylaws specify certain types of actions that management
cannot take, and critically, have binding legal effect that can be enforced
in court. The fundamental tenet of BG is that bylaws are valid as to any
issue19 so long as they are consistent with the certificate of incorporation
and preserve nearly all20 of the board’s discretion to act according to its
best business judgment.
18. I refer here to the governance principles established in positive law by statute
or case law, along with corollaries that would be accepted by most observers (though
disputes may rage on normative issues). These include the propositions that: (a)
management power is vested in the board of directors; (b) shareholders’ inalienable
right to guide corporate policy is limited to selecting directors and voting on specific
matters as provided by statute; (c) a central role of the board of directors is to supervise
and oversee the performance of the company’s officers; and (d) directors’ fiduciary
duties run to the shareholders in the first instance. See generally Stephen Bainbridge,
Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV.
547 (2003) (describing the implications of modeling the firm as a nexus of contracts);
Jill Fisch, Corporate Governance: Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265
(1997) (describing the managing and monitoring duties of the board); Leo E. Strine,
Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution
for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759 (2006) (stating the
Delaware vice-chancellor’s exposition of the traditional norms of corporate
governance); Henry Hansmann & Rainer Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001) (describing the convergence of corporate governance
systems worldwide toward a loosely defined “standard model” of shareholder-oriented
but director-managed corporate governance); Martin Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch, A
Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance, 48 BUS. LAW. 59 (1992)
(outlining a set of governance proposals as to board function and composition that were
widely accepted in the years after it was published).
19. Any issue, in theory. But most ordinary business decisions will not be easily
subject to circumscribing bylaws. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
20. The words “very nearly” perhaps understate the case. The central idea is that
the board’s managerial power is not diminished by prohibitions on specific, identifiable
actions. At most, the directors could lose the unchecked power to adopt their favorite
alternative of many roughly equivalent options. Such power may permit directors or
other corporate insiders to extract rents—perhaps subconsciously—even when they
remain faithful to the corporations’ best interests. See infra notes 88-90 and
accompanying text.
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A. THE STATUTORY BASIS OF BG
The primary statutory basis for BG is section 109 of the Delaware
General Corporate Law (“DGCL”), which defines the corporate bylaw
power. Section 109(a) establishes that:
After a corporation . . . has received any payment for any of its
stock, the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws shall be in the
stockholders entitled to vote. Notwithstanding the foregoing, any
corporation may, in its certificate of incorporation, confer the power
to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws upon the directors . . . . The fact
that such power has been so conferred upon the directors . . . shall
not divest the stockholders . . . of the power, nor limit their power to
21
adopt, amend or repeal bylaws.

In recent scholarship, Professors Gordon Smith and Christopher
Bruner have separately noted that § 109(a) vests shareholders with an
inherent authority over the bylaws that the certificate may not limit.22
However, the issue may be more complex than they let on. The statutory
text states only that the granting of bylaw power to the board does not
itself divest shareholders of their bylaw power. Nowhere does § 109(a)
address whether the shareholders’ bylaw power can be separately
compromised by a certificate provision expressly devoted to that end.
Indeed, one could interpret the concluding sentence as merely a
clarification that the bylaw power can in fact be concurrent; without
such an explicit statutory command, courts and companies might have
concluded that the granting of bylaw power to the board removes it from
shareholders.
Still, a careful statutory analysis reaches the same conclusion as
Professors Smith and Bruner. While § 109(a) may not expressly prohibit
the divesture of the shareholders’ bylaw power in the certificate, neither
does it authorize that divestiture. Thus, the authority to do so would
have to come from some other provision of the DGCL. The most natural
candidate would be § 102(b)(1), which permits the certificate to contain

21.
22.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109.
See D. Gordon Smith, Matthew Wright, & Marcus Kai Hintze, Private
Ordering with Shareholder Bylaws, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 150 (2011) (arguing that
“the concluding sentence of § 109(a) seems designed to drive the point home that
shareholders have an immutable statutory power”); Christopher M. Bruner, Managing
Corporate Federalism: The Least-Bad Approach to the Shareholder Bylaw Debate, 36
DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (2011) (asserting that the corporate charter, per § 109(a) “may not
limit the shareholders’ own bylaw authority”).
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“any provision creating, defining, limiting and regulating the powers of
the corporation, the directors, and the stockholders.”23 However, if this
provision (or any other grant of authority) could apply to bylaws, then §
109(a) would be redundant. Why would that section need to provide that
“any corporation may, in its certificate of incorporation, confer the
power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws upon the directors” if
§102(b)(1) already authorizes it? The doctrine of independent
significance, a fundamental interpretive principle in Delaware,24
suggests that § 109(a) must have a purpose—which is to say that it must
authorize something that § 102(b)(1) does not. In addition, even if both
sections were to establish that the certificate can grant bylaw power to
the board, Delaware courts also apply the maxim that any conflict
between two statutory sections should be resolved in favor of the more
specific one.25 In this case, § 109(a) specifically declines to authorize the
certificate to retract the shareholders’ bylaw power, and certainly
implies—though does not expressly state—that the shareholders’ bylaw
power cannot be compromised.26 For these reasons, it is safe to agree
with the recent scholarship that the shareholders’ bylaw power is
“sacrosanct.”27
Section 109(b) presents a greater interpretive challenge. It provides
that:
(b) The bylaws may contain any provision, not inconsistent with law
or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of the
corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the
rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or
28
employees.

23.
24.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1).
On the significance of this doctrine in Delaware corporate law, see D. Gordon
Smith, Independent Legal Significance, Good Faith and the Interpretation of Venture
Capital Contracts, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 825, 828-40 (2004).
25. See, e.g., Turnbull v. Fink, 668 A.2d 1370, 1377 (Del. 1995) (holding that
when “two potentially conflicting statutes” cannot be reconciled, “the specific statute
must prevail over the general”).
26. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a).
27. See supra note 22.
28. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109.
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The interaction of this section with § 141(a)29 has been famously
described as a “recursive loop.”30 According to this analysis, if
shareholders enacted a bylaw pertaining to managerial decisions, it
would violate the delegation of managerial authority to the board set
forth in § 141(a). However, § 141(a)’s allocation of managerial power to
the board can be curtailed by another provision of the DGCL—for
instance, § 109(b) permits shareholders to enact bylaw provisions
“relating to the business of the corporation.”31 Together, the two sections
make clear that managers have exclusive managerial authority on all
issues that lay beyond the shareholders’ bylaw power. Unfortunately,
this is a tautology—every possible allocation of authority between
directors and shareholders is consistent with the statutory language.32
We know that there must be some decisions shareholders cannot make
with their residual bylaw power, as corporations are not participatory
democracies.33 But the line between valid and invalid bylaws does not
appear to be demarcated by §109(b) and §141(a) alone.
In the absence of determinate statutory language, various theories
of bylaw validity have been constructed around policy considerations.34
29. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (providing that “the business and affairs of
every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors,” unless otherwise provided by the DGCL).
30. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Just Say Never?” Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and
Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511,
546-47 (1997) (noting that any interpretation of the scope of the bylaw power runs into
a “recursive loop,” because the bylaws are restricted by § 141(a), but § 141(a) is limited
by other provisions in the DGCL, presumably including § 109).
31. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b).
32. For instance, suppose A believes that compensation matters can be determined
by shareholders under § 109(b). She would argue that the § 141(a) grant of exclusive
authority to the board is limited by the grant of authority over compensation in §
109(b). By contrast, if B believes that compensation is not within shareholders’ power,
but business strategy is, he would make exactly the same argument, merely using the
word strategy wherever A uses the word compensation. Both arguments have exactly
the same truth value. The recursive loop provides no mechanism for preferring one
argument over another, nor over C’s argument in which “compensation” is replaced by
“nothing.”
33. See, e.g., Quickturn Design Sys. v. Mentor Graphics, Inc., 721 A.2d 1281,
1291 (Del. 1998) (holding that “[o]ne of the most basic tenets of Delaware corporate
law is that the board of directors has the ultimate responsibility for managing the
business and affairs of a corporation[]” per § 141(a)).
34. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Bylaw Battlefield: Can Institutions Change
the Outcome of Corporate Control Contests? 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 605 (1997)
(proposing ways to distinguish valid from invalid bylaws); McDonnell, supra note 10 at
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These theories, however, have largely failed, because they turn on ad
hoc distinctions between business decisions that are somehow ‘special’
enough to be regulated by shareholders, and the day-to-day decisions
that entirely remain in the hands of the directors.35 For instance, it has
been argued that bylaws are valid insofar as they address ‘special’ issues
that are “fundamental” or “procedural,” or related to “corporate
governance,” and invalid if they pertain to “ordinary,” “substantive,” or
“business decisions.”36 However, it is optimistic to assume that clean
taxonomies—or even ones that are not convoluted and cryptic—can be
imposed on the wide range of actions that boards may take. Many
decisions have many different ramifications, and thus can be both
special and ordinary. For instance, determining executive compensation
is a quintessentially managerial task and part of the more general issue
of resource allocation within the firm. But that decision also
disproportionately influences the basic nature of the shareholders’
investment, as it affects the future direction of the company, the risktolerance of executives, and its responsiveness to shareholders’ interests.
To argue that compensation is (or is not) shareholder-actionable is
simply to privilege, without basis in statute or case law, one of these
different aspects of the compensation decision.
This Article contends that the interaction between § 109(b) and §
141(a) is greatly clarified by the oft-ignored § 109(a). That latter
provision holds the key to determining bylaw validity—not because of
the rule it sets forth, but rather because it sets forth a mandatory rule.
Mandatory rules of corporate law are precious. Most provisions of the
DGCL establish default rules that can be modified by the certificate.
Only three other corporate governance rules37 are mandatory and nonwaivable, each one applying to issues of the utmost importance to

237 & 251 (summarizing the views of scholars on the subject of bylaw validity and
arguing that the validity of a bylaw should turn on whether it pertains to corporate
governance).
35. For a critique of such distinctions as ad hoc, and a view that bylaws seeking to
control director authority are anachronistic, see Lawrence A. Hammermesh, Corporate
Democracy and Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: Taking Back the Street?, 73 TUL. L.
REV. 409, 433-46 (1998).
36. See Coffee, supra note 34, at 613-15.
37. This specifically refers to rules that allocate power between the board, the
officers, and the shareholders.
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shareholders:38 the shareholders’ merger veto must be preserved;39
charter amendments are subject to shareholder approval;40 and the
shareholders must be permitted to inspect the books and records.41 Many
indisputably weighty matters do not receive this level of protection. For
instance, the allocation of managerial authority to the board can be
modified by charter,42 and voting rights can be eliminated for some
classes of stock.43 It would therefore be logical to expect that the
38. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1554 n.16 (1989). As Professor Gordon notes, there are other
mandatory provisions, but these are not rules so much as limitations or qualifications of
powers that are purely optional. For instance, if the company wants a staggered board, a
maximum of three classes can be created; if the board or shareholders wants to delegate
board power to a committee, that delegation cannot include decisions over mergers or
bylaw amendments, etc. Gordon cites the rule that derivative suits cannot be brought
without prior demand on the board, but that is a rule of civil procedure, not of the
DGCL. See Del. Ct. Ch. R. 23.1(a) (a derivative suit “complaint shall also allege with
particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff
desires from the directors”). There is also the appraisal right, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 262, which cannot be waived as such in the charter. But the appraisal right is not
available for publicly traded companies in stock-for-stock deals. Thus, the board can
avoid the appraisal right at its discretion; far from being non-waivable, the appraisal
right is, in an important sense, optional.
39. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (providing that a merger agreement shall
become effective only when “a majority of the outstanding stock of [each] corporation
entitled to vote thereon shall be voted for the adoption of the agreement”); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 271(a) (“Every corporation may . . . sell, lease or exchange all or
substantially all of its property and assets . . . when and as authorized by a resolution
adopted by the holders of a majority of the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled
to vote . . . .”).
40. All charter amendments must be ratified by the shareholders. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 242(b)(1). In addition, charter amendments that adversely affect the rights or
economic interests of a particular class of stock must be ratified by a majority vote of
that class. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2).
41. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b).
42. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (“The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of
a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its
certificate of incorporation.”).
43. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a) (“Unless otherwise provided in the certificate
of incorporation . . . each stockholder shall be entitled to 1 vote for each share of capital
stock held by such stockholder.”). Non-voting common stock is not frequently issued,
but it does occasionally show up in the case law. See, e.g., In re Frederick’s of
Hollywood, Inc., No. C.A. 15944, 2000 WL 130630, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2000)
(“As of December 6, 1996, Frederick’s had issued and outstanding . . . 5,903,118 shares
of Class B common stock (which were non-voting) that were held by approximately
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shareholders’ inviolate bylaw power would carry considerable
significance. It would make little sense for the legislature to build a
fortress around a power that could be exercised only with respect to
isolated and largely trivial issues such as establishing the board’s
quorum.44
In other words, the bylaw power should be interpreted to protect the
shareholders’ essential interest in preventing gross mismanagement.
Admittedly, § 109 provides no textual foundation for such a claim, but
the existence and nature of such an interest can be inferred by analogy.
Each of the other mandatory rules protects the shareholders’ investment
from being spoiled by the faithlessness or negligence of the board. The
shareholder veto over mergers protects the shareholders from being
forced to sell their equity at a lowball price;45 the veto over charter
amendments protects the shareholders from the curtailment of essential
rights;46 and the right to inspect the books gives shareholders the ability
to detect misappropriation of corporate funds by the board.47 These
rights were made non-waivable to guard against opportunism by the
board and/or powerful insider shareholders, who otherwise might

504 shareholders of record.”). Preferred stock frequently is stripped of voting rights. It
is unclear if a corporation can eliminate voting rights from all classes of its equity
securities.
44. Cf. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 235 (Del. 2008)
(noting that § 141(b) “authorizes bylaws that fix the number of directors on the board,
[and] the number of directors required for a quorum (with certain limitations)”).
45. See Gordon, supra note 38, at 1593 (noting that “[t]ransactions that transform
the economic structure of the firm” such as mergers or asset sales are subject to nonwaivable rules because such transactions can “tilt economic payoffs in a large-scale
way”).
46. Id. at 1591 (arguing that charter amendments should be viewed “in the same
light as a merger between a parent and a partially owned subsidiary”). Charters also
specify liquidation preferences. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 151(a), 242(a)(3)
(specifying that designations and preferences shall be stated and expressed in the
certificate of incorporation, and that the certificate can be amended to change the par
value, preferences or designations of shares). Thus, shareholders without a veto power
over certificate amendments could find their preferences eliminated, or alternately, their
residual interests crushed underneath a mountain of preferred stock.
47. See, e.g., ATR-Kim Eng Fin. Corp. v. Araneta, No. 489-N, 2006 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 215, at *20-25 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2006) (describing how a minority shareholder
used a “books and records” request to discover that the majority shareholder had
secretly stripped assets from the corporation and diverted them to his family members).
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pressure or deceive shareholders into alienating them.48 Consequently,
the bylaw power should protect against some similarly severe loss of
equity value that shareholders might not otherwise be able to prevent.
Indeed, the importance of such protection follows directly from the
business judgment rule, which insulates directors from liability for their
bad managerial decisions. Chancellor Allen has eloquently explained
why shareholders should not want the ability to sue directors merely for
making risky investment decisions: as a group, shareholders generally
profit when the board takes risks, and a rule that holds the board
responsible for answering for risks gone awry would chill the very
behavior that shareholders want to promote.49 However, this astute
reasoning tells us only that shareholders should not want the right to
hold the board liable ex post. It does not mean they should be indifferent
to the board’s foolishness. It is often said that the shareholders’ chief
remedy for inadequate performance of management is the power of the
franchise—the ability to remove underperforming directors from the
board.50 Nowhere is it written that this removal power—largely a
48. See Gordon, supra note 38, at 1574-75. In re Delphi Financial Group
Shareholder Litigation, No. 7144-VCG, 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 45 (Del. Ch. 2012)
describes an interesting example of such pressure. There, the founder, CEO and
controlling shareholder of Delphi Financial essentially forced the public shareholders to
repeal a certificate provision preventing him from obtaining a control premium for his
shares in a proposed acquisition. In re Delphi Financial Group Shareholder Litigation,
No. 7144-VCG, 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 45 at *3 (Del. Ch. 2012). That provision had
been added to the charter when the company was taken public in 1990, presumably as a
sale of the control premium right during the IPO. Id. at *3. Twenty years later, the
controlling shareholder refused to permit the company to be sold—at an approximately
100% premium to market!—unless that provision was eliminated to allow him to
receive an even higher price. Id. at *3-4. What choice did the board have, but to put the
certificate amendment to the shareholders, and what choice did the shareholders have
but to approve? On those facts, shareholders might be protected by fiduciary duties; the
allegations in Delphi that the controller had acted in bad faith survived a motion to
dismiss. The opinion’s reasoning gives little reason to think that its holding would
apply far beyond the specific facts.
49. See Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052-55 (Del. Ch. 1996).
50. See, e.g., MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1127 (Del. 2003)
(noting that “[the Delaware Supreme] Court has repeatedly stated that, if the
stockholders are not satisfied with the management or actions of their elected
representatives on the board of directors, the power of corporate democracy is available
to the stockholders to replace the incumbent directors”); Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp.,
564 A.2d 651, 659 (noting that “[g]enerally, shareholders have only two protections
against perceived inadequate business performance. They may sell their stock . . . or
they may vote to replace incumbent board members”).
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reactive remedy51—implies that shareholders are powerless to take
prophylactic measures. To the contrary, enabling such ex ante protection
against mismanagement appears to be the central purpose of § 109.
At the same time, bylaws must respect, per the “not inconsistent
with law” language of § 109(b),52 the fundamental command of § 141(a)
that the firm’s “business and affairs . . . shall be managed . . . by or
under the direction of a board of directors.” Fortunately, these two
provisions can be reconciled more easily than the “recursive loop”53
argument suggests.54 Section 141(a), by its own terms, is a general grant
of managerial authority to the board; so long as bylaws do not challenge
that general grant, they can be consistent with § 141(a) regardless of
what issues they address. To be sure, a bylaw could easily encroach on
the board’s authority if it imposes on it particular managerial decisions,
either directly (i.e. bylaws of the form “the board must do X”) or
indirectly (i.e. bylaws of the form “the board must not do A, B, C, etc.”
so that the only practicable choice remaining would be X). However, if
an individual bylaw seeks to protect against mismanagement by
identifying a single policy that it prohibits the board from implementing,
leaving the board with virtually unlimited alternatives, it is hard to see
how that in anyway threatens the statutory command of § 141(a).
To say that the board has broad managerial discretion is to say that
it has a very large set of possible decisions at its disposal.55 At the same

51. In theory, it is possible for shareholders to anticipate that the business strategy
of the board will have unhappy results, and thus remove the board proactively. In
practice, the board is very rarely removed until the firm has performed quite poorly. See
generally BEBCHUK & FRIED, infra note 99.
52. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109.
53. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a).
54. See generally Gordon, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
55. Indeed, unless the board’s power is constrained by the certificate of authority,
there are few lawful actions that the board cannot approve. It can donate corporate
assets to charity. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 122(9) (“Every corporation . . . shall have
power to [m]ake donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific or
educational purposes . . . .”); Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398
(Del. Ch. 1969) (holding that § 122 authorizes any charitable donations so long as they
are “reasonable”). Boards commonly give money away to private individuals—namely,
former executives—in what Bebchuk and Fried call “gratuitous goodbye payments.”
See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Symposium on Bebchuck & Fried’s Pay
without Performance: Overview of the Issues, 30 IOWA J. CORP. L. 637, 663 (2005)
(describing the prevalence of severance payments not required by the executive’s
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time, § 109(b) permits the bylaws to remove large sets of options from
consideration by the directors—i.e. options that constitute the forms of
grievous mismanagement against which § 109(b) protects. The bylawenacted invalidation of certain types of decisions by the board leaves the
board with nearly unlimited discretion, and more or less as expansive as
if there were no bylaws at all. Moreover, in practice the shareholders
will enact but a handful of bylaws. If the bylaws are circumscribing in
nature, their effect on managerial discretion would be infinitesimal.
B. WHAT IS A CIRCUMSCRIBING BYLAW?
Section A described and derived the central tenet of BG:56 Bylaws
are valid and enforceable so long as they merely circumscribe the
board’s discretion, without attempting to control or bind it. Parts II and
III of this Article evaluate the consistency of this hypothesis with
Delaware case law, and section C of this Part will offer a normative
defense of BG. Before moving onto either of these topics, it will be
useful to more precisely define what it means for a bylaw to be
circumscribing, and to consider some concrete examples.
A bylaw is circumscribing if it prohibits the board from
implementing certain specified policies without reducing its overall
discretion.57 Bylaws that are not circumscribing can be said to be
controlling, in that they force the board, de jure or de facto, to adopt a
particular policy. Built into these concepts is a type of substance-overcompensation contract, which are granted to the executive after it has become clear that
the executive’s employment will be terminated).
56. It should be noted that this Article does not at all address federal securities law.
Many circumscribing bylaws of the sort that I contend are enforceable under Delaware
law might be excludable from the company’s proxy statement under Rule 14a-8. That
rule, for instance, permits the company to exclude proposals “deal[ing] with a matter
relating to the company’s ordinary business operations.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011).
Quite simply, proxy access and bylaw enforceability are distinct issues, even if they are
somewhat co-dependent in practice.
57. This distinction between circumscribing bylaws and controlling bylaws to
some degree resembles one of Professor Coffee’s hypothetical tests for bylaw
validity—one that he characterized as “affirmative orders versus negative constraints.”
See Coffee, supra note 34, at 614. However, it is not clear just what Coffee had in
mind. He mentioned this distinction only in passing, without any explanation of what it
meant, how it could operate as a legal rule, or how it was consistent with the statutory
text. He wrote that that the “case law seems clearest” in establishing this as a test of
bylaw validity, but no case citations. Id. Nor did he characterize the difference between
affirmative orders and negative constraints as an empirical question. Id. at 608-09.
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form analysis not unlike the one applied in CA.58 To determine whether
a bylaw was in fact circumscribing, a court would look not to the
wording or the logical structure of the proposed bylaw restriction, but
rather to the actual quantity and variety of options that would remain
open to the board when the bylaw is implemented.59 Thus,
characterizing a bylaw as circumscribing is a fact-bound, if not precise,
process.
It is important to be careful about defining what exactly constitutes
the board’s discretion. The number of options theoretically available to a
board of directors at any given time is nearly unlimited; if they were all
considered to be valid substitutes or alternatives for each other, then
even highly intrusive shareholder interference could be characterized as
circumscribing. For instance, consider the argument of an investor who
wants to characterize as circumscribing a bylaw prohibiting an
automaker from investing in any manufacturing facility that draws
power from a carbon-burning electric plant: millions of options would
still remain! The company could build in areas with an abundance of
wind power, launch (or acquire) a consulting business, invest in solar
energy, pay dividends instead of re-investing in the company, outsource
its manufacturing, etc. To accept this argument would grant
shareholders a veto power over nearly any substantive decision of the
firm, because those options (or equivalent ones) are always available.
The key concept for assessing whether a bylaw circumscribes or
controls is substitutability. What matters is not the number of options
theoretically retained by the board, but the number that are reasonably
substitutable for the policy that the bylaw purports to take away. This
inquiry should be framed by the legitimate purpose of the decision or

58. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 236 (Del. 2008)
(“But the Bylaw’s wording, although relevant, is not dispositive of whether or not it is
process-related. The Bylaw could easily have been worded differently, to emphasize its
process, as distinguished from its mandatory payment, component.”).
59. A hypothetical example illustrates the point. Suppose a company is considering
ten possible locations for siting a manufacturing facility: five in Mexico, four in Costa
Rica and one in Malaysia. If a shareholder proposes a bylaw that says “the company
shall not locate a manufacturing plant within 3000 miles of the United States border,” in
form, that is circumscribing. In reality, such a proposal would be functionally
equivalent to a binding bylaw requiring the facility to be sited in Malaysia. In such
cases, courts will look behind the formal structure to the underlying reality.
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policy prohibited by the bylaw.60 To use the automaker example above,
the investor’s argument would fail because a consulting business is not a
reasonable substitute for an automobile plant; the value propositions of
these two investments implicate completely different economic and
organizational concerns.61 Or to take an example from finance, issuing
equity is, in practice, rarely a reasonable substitute for issuing debt.62
Thus, a bylaw prohibiting new debt issuance would not be
circumscribing, but a bylaw prohibiting the issuance of certain types of
debt (e.g., debt with ultra-short maturity) might be. Of course,
shareholders would not invest energy passing bylaws about ordinary
business matters such as the term structure of debt,63—unless it was
something particularly dangerous, such as an overreliance on overnight

60. By “legitimate” purpose, I am referring only to the purposes that would be
accepted under the business judgment rule. Just as a director would not fare well in
court if she defended her decision as the best means to entrench herself in office, the
circumscribing nature of a bylaw would not be measured by whether the board retained
alternatives as useful for self-dealing or shirking. I am not intending to invoke any
strongly normative concept, such as the “legitimate business purpose” standard
articulated in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (1976).
61. For instance, a board might have an economic forecast in which demand for
automobiles increases, which would make the automobile plant an attractive
investment. It would say nothing in particular about demand for consulting—let alone
debt collection services, railroad transport or even automobile financing. It would be
outrageous to suggest that the board needs to consider all possible investments before
making its decision, or even attempt to find the globally optimal investment. Likewise,
boards will naturally take account of the manageability of the investment. For instance,
an auto company will find it much easier to manage a new auto plant than a non-auto
related investment. These two factors are just illustrations of the many ways in which
different types of investments would not be considered to be reasonable substitutes.
62. Typically, firms issue equity only when they are unable to finance their capital
needs from internal earnings or through debt. This is because the use of equity
financing sends a signal—intended or not—to the market that management thinks
poorly of the firm’s future prospects. Hence firms will find it cheaper to finance out of
internal earnings first, then to issue debt, and to issue equity only as a last resort. For
description of this “pecking order” theory of finance and some citations to empirical
evidence supporting it, see Robert P. Bartlett III, Taking Finance Seriously: How Debt
Financing Distorts Bidding Outcomes in Corporate Takeovers, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
1975, 1988 (2008).
63. Note that this would not be true of non-circumscribing bylaws. An investor
who foresees a future rise in interest rates might try to compel the board to issue only
long-maturity debt. This could be achieved by means of a controlling bylaw, but not
with a circumscribing one.
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repo borrowing rendering vulnerable to sudden illiquidity.64 In such
cases, a shareholder intervention may be greatly desirable.
To illustrate the concept, consider the following potentially useful
circumscribing bylaws, some of which will be discussed later in the
Article:


A Real Say On Pay: This type of bylaw would permit
shareholders to prohibit particular compensation practices,
although not necessarily the overall amount. For instance, a
bylaw might prohibit repricing of option grants, or require
the strike prices of granted options to be indexed to broader
market indices. Such bylaws would differ from the “say on
pay” provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act65 in two important
respects. First, they would have legal force, as opposed to
being merely advisory.66 Second, they would not give
shareholders a say over the entire compensation package,
but merely some input over the form that compensation will
take. Such bylaws would be circumscribing because they
would permit the board great latitude in setting the amount
of compensation and its form; only certain compensation
measures would be taken off the table.



No First Vote: This type of bylaw would prevent the board
from issuing shares of stock in a private placement without
a restriction preventing the shares from being voted in the
first annual and/or special meeting following their
issuance.67 The purpose here would be to prevent managers

64. This type of overreliance triggered the collapse of Bear Stearns and Lehman
Brothers. When counterparties chose not to lend against the repo collateral, Bear and
Lehman could not satisfy a huge balance of immediately due liabilities, since they were
holding mostly non-salable assets. See Brian J.M. Quinn, The Failure of Private
Ordering and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 549, 594 (2009). As it
turns out, most of those non-salable assets also turned out to be non-valuable, but in
theory both firms could have failed simply by virtue of the mismatched term structure
of their assets and liabilities.
65. Pub. L. No. 111-203 (July 21, 2010) (hereinafter “Dodd-Frank”).
66. Id. Dodd-Frank § 951 (providing that shareholder resolutions on compensation
“shall not be binding on the issuer or the board of directors of an issuer”).
67. Weaker forms of this bylaw might be more narrowly tailored to the bylaw’s
purpose at the expense of somewhat less protection of shareholders’ interests. For
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from stacking the deck in a close vote by issuing large
blocks of equity to allied third parties expected to vote in
favor of the managers’ position.68 It would be
circumscribing because it permits the company to raise
capital by practically any means imaginable, including
equity issuance.69


Director or Officer Term Limits: These speak for
themselves. They can prevent entrenchment,70 and promote
a level of director turnover sufficient to prevent the board
from becoming complacent or ineffective.71 Such limits
would be circumscribing because they permit the board to
choose nominees to the board from an almost unlimited
pool of applicants, just not the directors whose terms have
expired.



No Reappointment of Removed Directors: Boards of
directors sometimes reappoint directors who have been

instance, the restriction on the newly issued shares could last only 90 days, or perhaps a
separate shareholder vote would be required for it to have effect.
68. See, e.g., Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Holdings, Inc., 501 A.2d 401, 403-04 (Del.
1985) (describing a plan by a board of directors to dilute the holdings of an adverse
controlling shareholder by issuing stock to the company’s Stock Ownership Program,
administered by the board).
69. Indeed, it would be unlikely that new investors who are not white knights
would place a high value on a single shareholder vote. At the very most, the company
might have to accept a slightly lower price for the equity shares. If the company was
actually unable to issue equity on these terms, then the bylaw might cease to be
circumscribing in fact.
70. Term limits have been endorsed for this reason even by Martin Lipton, the
supposed entrencher of “me-first managers” and “apologist for embattled chief
executives who don’t like shareholders sounding off on excessive pay and cozy
boards.” See Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 18, at 68; for the unflattering
characterization, see Gretchen Morgensen, Memo to Shareholders: Shut Up, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 2007 at D1.
71. It is worth noting that from 2005 to 2008, the majority of the independent
directors of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers had served on the boards for more than
a decade, and disproportionately likely to be octogenarians. Some commentators have
opined that companies would be better served with somewhat younger directors. See,
e.g., Marc Goldstein, Mitigating Dysfunctional Deference Through Improvements in
Board Composition and Board Effectiveness, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 490, 497
(2009) (urging investors to weigh the benefits of “expertise and free time” against those
of “youth and diversity”).
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voted out of office.72 This quite obviously undermines the
efficacy of shareholder democracy. To be sure, the
reappointment decision is frequently motivated by good
reasons—for instance, the director might have expertise
rendering her service indispensable—but shareholders have
a good reason to prohibit this practice: their vote should
have a sting, so that directors are motivated to perform well.
As with the issue of term limits, the circumscribing nature
of this bylaw is obvious; it merely prevents the appointment
of a small number of individuals out of the entire universe
of qualified people.
The primary claim of this Article is that BG describes existing
Delaware law, because the Delaware courts will enforce circumscribing
bylaws as defined here. But before demonstrating that claim in the case
law, it will be useful to inquire why shareholders would want to be able
to promulgate circumscribing bylaws. By definition, they have a
somewhat limited effect and permit the directors to retain ample
discretion. In what ways are they useful? Would shareholders want more
than circumscribing power? How would circumscribing bylaws affect
the efficiency of corporate governance? These questions are addressed
in the next section.
C. THE NORMATIVE CASE FOR BG
BG, like all theories of corporate governance, addresses a
fundamental policy question: how can corporations operate efficiently
when they are run by directors and officers who do not bear the costs of
the decisions they make? As Berle and Means long ago observed,
modern businesses consume capital so prodigiously that their operations
can be financed only by aggregating the resources of a large number of

72. See, e.g., Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., No. 5817-CC, 2010 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 206, at *18 (Del. Ch. Oct. 8, 2010) (noting that, in response to a proxy
contest that removed a director from the board, the Airgas board added a new seat and
reappointed the removed director); U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Circon Corp., No. 15223,
1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 161, at *4 (Del. Ch. Sept 17, 1997) (describing an announcement
made by a company in its proxy statement that it would consider reappointing a director
if the shareholders voted him out of office).
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investors, most commonly on a foundation of publicly owned equity.73
Professor Bainbridge, among many others, has reminded us that such a
dispersed ownership base cannot manage an enterprise.74 Perhaps more
importantly, investors by and large do not want to.75 The task must be
delegated to dedicated professionals, and this, of course, creates an
incentive for those professional managers to shirk.76 While investors
seek to minimize shirking (more precisely, the agency costs of
shirking77), they also want to respect the managers’ autonomy; after all,
the managers were hired in the first place because investors lack enough
information to intelligently make (or evaluate) business decisions.
Thus, the delicate task of corporate governance is to reduce agency
costs while preserving sufficient independence for managers to make the
decisions needed to maximize the value of the firm.78 By this measure,
73. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and
Private Property 6 (1932). Today, publicly-traded stock is common but not necessary.
The “public” can indirectly own equity stakes in companies by means of intermediaries
such as private equity, hedge or mutual funds. Companies controlled by private equity
funds are considered closely held from a legal and operational point of view, though the
economic benefits of that equity ownership may be widely dispersed.
74. See Bainbridge, supra note 18, at 557 (describing the problems inherent in
decision-making structures characterized by dispersed authority).
75. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and
Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 301-02 (1983) (arguing that corporations benefit from
the separation of ownership and control because it can take advantage of the
specialization of labor, hiring professional managers with deep expertise in their field).
76. On the definition of shirking as used in this article, see supra note 8.
77. Quite obviously, investors care about the impact of shirking on the bottom line,
not the metaphysical question of “how much” shirking is going on. The cost of shirking
is typically referred to as an agency cost, by analogy to the loss that a principal suffers
when the agent does not faithfully follow instructions. See, e.g., Robert H. Sitkoff, The
Economic Structure Of Fiduciary Law, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1039, 1042 (2011) (“The losses
and other inefficiencies resulting from the misalignment of the principal’s and the
agent’s interests are called agency costs.”). Note that this terminology does not imply
that the directors or managers should be regarded as agents of shareholders. See, e.g.,
Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits Of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 791
(2007) (describing the incidence of agency costs in an article denying the validity of the
principal/agent model of corporations).
78. This formulation is intended to be as consistent with as many theories of the
firm as possible. The vast majority of corporate scholars would agree that reducing
agency costs and maximizing the value of the firm are both desirable ends, all else
being equal. I leave open the possibility that these goals are not fully compatible, which
is to say that value might be maximized when agency costs are greater than the
minimum achievable level. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 77, at 790 (arguing that
shareholders benefit from board governance despite its high agency costs, because it
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BG can outperform the two governance paradigms that have received
the most attention and advocacy from scholars in recent years. The
“director primacy” (“DP”) view of corporate governance asserts that
corporations run most efficiently when managerial authority is
centralized in the board of directors as much as possible.79 Adherents of
this view expect the board both to closely monitor the officers to make
sure they are not shirking, and to fend off demands from the
shareholders for near term profits that might come at the expense of
long-term success.80 By contrast, the “shareholder empowerment” view
contemplates an active role for shareholders in the management of the
corporation, permitting them to decide a number of fundamental issues,
such as when the corporation should liquidate, distribute its earnings,
sell itself to a bidder, or where it should incorporate.81 This view, most
closely identified with Professor Bebchuk, profoundly distrusts the
directors’ ability and/or inclination to act in the best interests of the
shareholders, and calls attention to structural biases in board decisionmaking that result in inefficiently lavish compensation for managers and
job security for the directors and officers alike.82
1. BG vs. Director Primacy
When comparing BG with DP, it should be noted at the outset that
BG only mildly deviates from DP’s central descriptive and normative
“also promotes efficient and informed decision-making” among other more-thanoffsetting benefits). If that were the case, I believe most scholars would prioritize value
maximization. Real disagreement exists, however, as to whether the maximized value
should be that of the shareholders’ equity or a broader measure of economic value.
Compare Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 18, at 439-40 (arguing that the proper
role of the corporate board and management is to maximize shareholder wealth), with
Kent Greenfield, Defending Stakeholder Governance, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1043
(2008) (arguing that the concerns of all the firm’s investors, including “employees,
communities [and] creditors,” should be “brought into the governance of the firm”). My
intention is to be agnostic on these issues.
79. See, e,g., Bainbridge, supra note 18 (expounding his view on the importance of
director primacy).
80. See, e.g., Lipton & Savitt, supra note 11, at 745-46, 750-51 (describing how a
strong board of directors can protect against “short-termism” in corporate management
and protect the firm from “runaway agency costs”).
81. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118
HARV. L. REV. 833, 836-37 (2005).
82. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, infra note 99, at 1-15.
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contention that the management of the corporation is best left to the
board. The difference is that BG recognizes the validity and usefulness
of circumscribing bylaws. However, bylaws will always be far less
numerous than managerial decisions, so the differences between the two
systems would be situated mostly at the margins. One might describe
BG as a director primacy system with an attached bylaw feature. Thus,
comparing the two paradigms is mostly a matter of understanding the
value of the bylaw option.
The central advantage of BG is its ability to reduce agency costs
over what DP can achieve. To see this, consider a commonly used
method for controlling shirking by managers: equity compensation.83
When executives are stockholders, they certainly have more incentive to
increase the value of the corporation’s shares,84 but this effect wears out
well before the point of value optimization.85 Moreover, incentive
alignment is rarely effective against the pursuit of private rewards,
because managers will enjoy all of their benefits, but bear only a pro
rata share of the costs.86 Equity ownership by executives can

83. See, e.g., Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Stock Unloading and Banker Incentives, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 951, 953 (2012) (discussing use of equity compensation to reduce
agency costs). As explained above, supra note 78, one need not believe that directors or
managers are agents to accept that analogy for purposes of defining and diagnosing
agency costs.
84. Since the financial crisis of 2008, scholars have paid more attention to a nasty
side effect of equity compensation—namely, its encouragement of excessively riskseeking behavior on the part of managers. See, e.g., Simone M. Sepe, Making Sense of
Executive Compensation, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189, 192 (2011). This is a real problem
and I would not minimize its significance. However, it only reinforces the point being
made in this section—that structural approaches have important limitations, and
discussing it at length simply introduces needless complication.
85. This is a simple matter of the declining marginal utility of labor and wealth.
Assuming managers rationally pursue the easiest money first, the effect of increasing
their price-maximizing effort—either by working harder or by increasingly focusing on
increasing share price (as opposed to, for instance, their own job security)—decreases
as the level of that effort increases. At the same time, the managers are getting wealthier
as the share price increases, and thus the utility they derive from additional increases in
stock price also declines. At some point, the executives will decline to increase their
effort and/or faithfulness because it will not be worth it for them—even though it would
still be valuable for shareholders.
86. To be sure, sophisticated equity compensation systems that rely on derivative
instruments (such as deep out of the money options) might be able to increase the
sensitivity of the executives’ portfolio to small valuation changes resulting from
shirking. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 55, at 665. However, these systems would
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significantly change their incentives with respect to big decisions. For
instance, it discourages repeated rejections of premium acquisition
offers, as that practice can be expected to dramatically reduce the
company’s share price.87 However, equity ownership is less effective at
deterring managers from seeking costly perks, as the executives enjoy
the benefits of their perks privately while spreading the costs across the
entire shareholder base.88 Board members who hold equity only have an
incentive to stand firm against managerial rent-seeking that is
proportional to their typically small stake in the firm.89 A small financial
incentive can be outweighed by a subjective utility in acquiescing to
managers’ demands—especially if the directors themselves expect to
partake of some of the perquisites themselves.90
Thus, there is no substitute for scrupulous monitoring of the
executives, by the board and/or the shareholders. Equity holdings
notwithstanding, managers are likely to give their best stock price-

be very difficult to value and could produce disproportionate windfalls for executives if
their tenure happens to be successful.
87. Bratton and Wachter describe a heterogeneous expectations model for stocks,
in which the stock prices are seen as “as having two components: first, the fundamental
value of the stock; and second, the present owner’s option to sell her stock to an even
more optimistic investor.” Bratton & Wachter, supra note 12, at 707. Since acquirers
are almost by definition the most optimistic of investors, it is easy to see that under this
model, a firm’s “just say no” stance to all acquisition offers would decrease the current
stock price.
88. Professors Henderson and Spindler have argued that it is good for companies to
lavish perks—i.e. private jets, limo service, cheap loans, etc.—on their executives,
because the executives become addicted to this “corporate heroin.” M. Todd Henderson
& James C. Spindler, Corporate Heroin: A Defense of Perks, Executive Loans, and
Conspicuous Consumption, 93 GEO. L.J. 1835, 1878 (2005). The idea is that the
executives fear of losing these benefits would make them extremely averse to the risk
of losing their jobs through sub-optimal performance. Id. It’s a clever idea, but not one
that is useful for practical application. A board seeking to use the “corporate heroin”
approach would have to determine how much utility their executives subjectively and
unobservably ascribe to various perks—a task made even more difficult by the
executives’ incentives to feed disinformation to the board. Id. If the executives can
convincingly exaggerate their utility and their avarice, they can reap a windfall.
89. See id. (describing the ways in which board members share in the perquisites
typically granted to executives).
90. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried, & David I. Walker, Managerial
Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 751, 754 (2002) (arguing that “executives can receive pay in excess of the level
that would be optimal for shareholders; this excess pay constitutes rents”).
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maximizing effort only if they understand they will be punished for not
doing so. In addition, management can simply make errors, believing in
good faith in the ultimate success of bad managerial strategies. A good
corporate governance system provides some mechanism by which these
mistakes are corrected before they ruin the company.91
In director primacy systems, it is assumed that the board will
monitor the executives and the shareholders will monitor the board.
However, neither form of supervision is fully adequate. Directors have
their own incentives to shirk, and they do.92 Much recent scholarship has
been devoted to explaining why independent directors can be expected,
in theory, to be diligent in monitoring the executives.93 Yet empirical
studies have shown that the firm valuation is relatively unaffected by the

91. While the spectacular flameouts of investment banks like Bear Stearns and
Lehman Brothers deservedly grab the headlines, companies can be damaged by poor
managerial decisions more subtly and gradually over time. Consider the example of
Holland Furnace Company, the business at the center of the famous greenmail case
Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964). Holland’s business was selling home
furnaces door-to-door. Id. at 550. The firm’s management was so proud of this business
model that it took extraordinary measures—with the active support of the board—to
fend off a takeover effort by an entrepreneur who thought that furnaces could be more
efficiently sold at a retail or department store. Id. at 552-53. Had the board taken its job
more seriously, it might have noticed that the company’s stock traded on the market for
less than half its book value. Id. This sure signal that investors expected the company to
lose money in the near future was ignored, and to nobody’s surprise, the door-to-door
furnace company soon went out of business. Id.
92. To cite one of many examples, board shirking played an important role in the
collapse of MF Global. Not long after the firm acquired a huge portfolio of risky
sovereign debt that led to its collapse, its chief risk officer, Michael Roseman, alerted
the board to the extent of the firm’s downside exposure. See Ben Protess & Azam
Ahmed, Lax Oversight Blamed in Demise of MF Global, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2012, at
B6. Instead of investigating the situation—which would have brought the board into
some conflict with the firm’s CEO, Jon Corzine—the board simply looked for a new
chief risk officer. Id. Roseman resigned, and the board hired someone who, in the
words of one U.S. Congressman, “would tell Mr. Corzine what he wanted to hear.” Id.
(quoting Representative William J. Posey of Florida).
93. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 18, at 281-83 (arguing that independent directors
lack motivation to permit managers to destroy shareholder value, as they will not
personally benefit); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United
States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV.
1465, 1563 (2009) (arguing that when corporations try to maximize shareholder value
and stock market prices are informative, “independent directors are more valuable than
insiders”).
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percentage of the board comprised of independent directors.94 This is
hardly a shocking discovery. Directors get paid no matter how much
time they devote to their tasks and the consequences to them of failure
are minimal.95 Thus, boards too often fail to exercise sufficient diligence
to protect against manager-induced catastrophic failure.96 Director
independence may help reduce the power of CEOs to some degree,97 but
often the directors are not given the resources necessary to adequately
monitor the executives.98 On compensation-related matters, even
independent boards simply do not implement effective strategies. For
94. See Gordon, supra note 93, at 1468 (noting the “lack of correlation between the
presence of independent directors and the firm’s economic performance” and that
“studies have searched in vain for an economically significant effect on the overall
performance of the firm”); P.M. Vasudev, Default Swaps and Director Oversight:
Lessons from AIG, 35 J. CORP. L. 757, 782-83 (2010) (observing that the board of AIG
was dominated by independent directors in the years before its collapse).
95. The business judgment rule usually protects directors from liability, and, in
addition, they enjoy liability insurance purchased for them by the company. See Steven
M. Davidoff, Ex-Directors of Failed Firms Have Little to Fear, DEALBOOK - N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 2, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/02/ex-directors-of-failedfirms-have-little-to-fear/. While it has been claimed that directors fear the harm to
reputation that comes from presiding over a corporate collapse, recent evidence
suggests that their careers are minimally impacted, if at all. Id.
96. For instance, the nominally independent boards at Lehman Brothers and Bear
Stearns were largely dysfunctional before those firms’ collapse. At Lehman, most of the
policy was made by the executive committee comprised of CEO Richard Fuld and John
C. Macomber—an ex-CEO who was retired for twenty years and who had no
background in financial services. The risk committee met only twice in 2007. Bear
Stearns did not even have a risk committee until March 2007—only a year before its
collapse and probably well after it had purchased enough bad debt that insolvency was
inevitable. See generally, Richard Lieberman, Corporate Governance Lessons From
The 2008 Financial Crisis: Assessing The Effectiveness Of Corporate Governance
Through A Look At Troubled Companies, 64 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 425, 427
(2010).
97. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987,
989 (2010) (arguing that CEOs “are losing power to boards of directors that
increasingly consist of both nominally and substantively independent directors”).
98. See, e.g., Nicola Faith Sharpet, The Cosmetic Independence of Corporate
Boards, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1435, 1435 (2011) (arguing that outside directors may
appear to be independent, when in fact they do not have the resources to be
“substantively independent”); Anita Anand, Frank Milne, & Lynnette Purda,
Monitoring to Reduce Agency Costs: Examining the Behavior of Independent and NonIndependent Boards, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 809, 814 (2010) (presenting evidence that
independent and non-independent boards act similarly, and thus there is little
performance difference in the respective firms).
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instance, they grant stock options at the money and do not award
compensation that is sensitive to underlying firm performance.99 To the
extent that managers might be motivated to perform better out of fear of
being ousted, generous severance packages can mitigate that
motivation.100
Shareholders may fare no better in monitoring directors; they have
only blunt instruments at their disposal and therefore can discipline only
very poorly performing boards. To punish a director requires removing
her from office, which in turn requires the selection of a replacement. In
so doing, shareholders can choose only between retaining incumbent
directors and replacing them with a rival slate that usually has no track
record of managing the firm in question and whose performance
generally cannot be predicted.101 Assuming that the performance of the
company has, on the whole, been acceptable—perhaps it would be better
with reduced agency costs, but possibly worse with strategic or
operational mismanagement—replacement of the incumbent is risky.
The shareholders cannot mix the operational skills of one board and
combine them with the faithfulness of another; they must choose one
option or the other.102 This “bundling problem” presents itself to any
democratic polity with limited voting options.103 Managers and
99. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE (2004). As
the authors point out, at-the-money option grants are inefficient incentives. Id. They
permit executives to reap large financial rewards from a rising stock market, even if the
managers’ performance has been quite poor in relative terms. When options lose value
because of market conditions, the strike price is often reset. Bebchuk and Fried
advocate the indexing of equity grants to market and industry performance, a
suggestion that remains largely unfollowed.
100. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 55, at 666-76.
101. This is often referred to as the bundling problem, which Professor Bebchuk has
identified as a principal justification for shareholder empowerment. See Bebchuk, supra
note 81, at 857-64.
102. The shareholders can, of course, elect boards consisting of directors with
different areas of expertise. A board might have a compensation expert, an operations
expert, a finance expert, and so forth. There is little if any evidence, though, that these
“teams of experts” inherit the best qualities of their individual members.
103. See, e.g., NELSON W. POLSBY & AARON WILDAVSKY, PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS 292 (7th ed. 1988) (“It is possible for candidates to get 100 percent of the
votes and still have every voter opposed to most of their policies, as well as having
every one of their policies opposed by most of the voters.”); see also Peter Shane,
Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The Case of Presidential
Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161, 213 (1994); Cynthia R. Farina, Against Simple Rules
for a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 998 (1997). But see K.A.D. Camara,
Shareholder Voting and the Bundling Problem in Corporate Law, 2004 WIS. L. REV.
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directors, aware of this problem, realize that they may extract rents
without effective punishment so long as the overall performance
remains solid.
At this point, it is evident why circumscribing bylaws might be
useful: they permit shareholders to corral the worst excesses of
management directly and correct the board’s egregious failures without
having to replace a majority of the directors. However, such bylaws
cannot force the board to implement any particular policy. In theory, the
shareholders could do this for any and all decisions of the board, but in
practice bylaws would be used sparingly, at most. Circumscribing
bylaws are purely defensive in nature, and cannot be used by
shareholders to impose their will on the board. Bylaws are also costly to
enact, therefore shareholders would only have an incentive to use them
against the type of highly inefficient policies that we might normally
characterize as abuses of power. Could shareholders use a series of
circumscribing bylaws to consistently remand board decisions in an
attempt to “wear down” the board and force it to acquiesce to their
demands? Such circumstances are plausible, but the chances of them
actually occurring are infinitesimal. After all, directors are more nimble
than shareholders; the former can act with a single meeting, whereas the
latter must laboriously collect consents or proxies from a majority of the
outstanding shareholders.104 The board usually wins wars of attrition.105

1425, 1429 (2004) (arguing, based on a rational-signaling model, that the bundling
problem is “largely illusory”).
104. To be sure, a small group of shareholders that together own a majority stake in
the company can move quickly, as they have but a small number of written consents to
obtain. In that case, however, they would not need to act via bylaw; they could simply
replace individual directors one by one, via that same written consent process, until the
board capitulated. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228(a) (providing that “any action
which may be taken at any annual or special meeting of such stockholders, may be
taken without a meeting, without prior notice and without a vote, if a consent or
consents in writing . . . shall be signed by the holders of outstanding stock having not
less than the minimum number of votes” required to take the action.); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 141(k) (providing that “[a]ny director or the entire board of directors may be
removed, with or without cause, by the holders of a majority of the shares”). If the
board is classified, then directors may not be removed individually without cause, see
id., so the process by which the majority bloc exerted its will on the board might be
more complex. Still, acting via circumscribing bylaw would be an inefficient way or
doing so.
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It may be asked why BG should stop at circumscribing bylaws. If
shareholders can control agency costs more effectively than the board,
then why not permit them to force the board toward the policy with the
lowest agency cost, instead of simply steering the board away from high
agency cost policies? Indeed, some scholars have suggested just such a
corporate governance paradigm, which can be described rather faithfully
as a “shareholder empowerment” approach. This is the subject of the
next subsection.
2. BG vs. Shareholder Empowerment
The central distinction between BG and “shareholder
empowerment” (“ShEmp”) is that the former countenances only
circumscribing bylaws, and the latter advocates for direct shareholder
control over corporate policy, whether via bylaws or expanded voting
rights over substantive issues. Shareholder empowerment has been a
debate largely framed by Professor Bebchuk’s seminal article “The Case
For Increasing Shareholder Power.”106 There, Bebchuk proposed to reallocate to shareholders decision-making power on issues such as
amending the charter, choosing a state of incorporation, scaling down
the corporate enterprise through asset sales and/or distributions, and
selling or dissolving the company.
For the same reasons that BG can reduce agency costs further than
systems of director primacy, it is likely that ShEmp could reduce them
even further. However, this governance paradigm comes with at least
one substantial drawback: empowered shareholders can badly disrupt
decision-making within the firm. While shareholders might occasionally
have incentive to intentionally harm the company,107 more frequently
their participation would be procedurally burdensome and would
interfere with management’s expert decision-making.108 Indeed,

105. Cf. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 55-56 (Del. Ch.
2011) (noting that Air Products had been attempting to acquire Airgas for 16 months,
but gave up because the fight had become too expensive).
106. Bebchuk, supra note 81.
107. Shareholders who have used derivative securities to take a net short position in
the firm would have an incentive to cause it harm. See Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard
Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S.
CAL. L. REV. 811, 815 (2006).
108. See, e.g., Bratton & Wachter, supra note 12, at 658-59 (noting that corporate
law “has always privileged the directors and their appointed managers [over
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sophisticated organizations cannot operate by referenda. Thus, at a
minimum, the powers given to shareholders—along with the rules as to
how and when they can be exercised—must be chosen with great care.
ShEmp advocates recognize the adverse effects that might stem
from unchecked investor participation in corporate decision-making, and
thus have proposed to restrict shareholder input to decisions pertaining
to the “rules of the game.” 109 Such proposals rest on the optimistic
assumption that a coherent distinction can be found between decisions
pertaining to the “rules” and those that occur during the game itself.110
Moreover, there is little reason to be confident that shareholders’ input
over rules will be innocuous. It is not hard to imagine opportunistic
investors using the threat of a dissolution vote to pressure the board to
make particular business decisions favorable to their interests, beliefs or
risk preferences.111 The mere threat itself may have force: directors and

shareholders] in business policymaking because they are better informed than the
shareholders . . . and best suited to maximize the value of the corporation”).
109. See Bebchuk, supra note 81 (advocating shareholder intervention for “rulesof-the-game decisions” such as changing the company’s state of incorporation).
110. For instance, Bebchuk categorizes two types of decisions rules-of-the-game:
state of incorporation, and amendments to the corporate charter. Id. But nearly anything
can be put in the charter. If shareholders want the company to quote prices to customers
only in Turkish lira, they could put a provision to that extent in the certificate. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1) (stating that the certificate of incorporation may contain
“[a]ny provision for the management of the business and for the conduct of the affairs
of the corporation . . . are not contrary to the laws of this State”). Clearly, a distinction
is needed between those types of certificate provisions that pertain to the rules and
those that do not; on this point, Bebchuk’s proposals are fuzzy.
111. This is far from a hypothetical scenario. Consider, for instance, the efforts by
Pershing Square Capital—a hedge fund with large holdings in the Target Corporation—
to convince and then cajole the Target board into a plan to spin off all of the company’s
real estate into a REIT, which would then lease the land back to Target. See Stephanie
Rosenbloom, Seeing Gold in Target’s Real Estate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2008, at B1.
The board repeatedly refused, in part because the proposal was very risky—meaning
that it was attractive to hedge fund managers compensated with a 2-and-20 structure,
but less attractive to other investors. The board’s refusal prompted Pershing Square to
launch a proxy contest, which it lost. See Zachery Kouwe, Target’s Shareholders
Strongly Reject Dissident Slate, Ending Divisive Proxy Battle, N.Y. TIMES, May 29,
2009, at B1. Had Pershing Square been able to threaten the board with rules-of-thegame changes, the board might have capitulated.
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executives, after all, are far more dependent on the firm’s continued
existence than diversified investors.112
These problems of decisional inefficiencies and shareholder
opportunism arise because ShEmp inadequately fine-tunes shareholder
authority. In the ShEmp paradigm, shareholders either have power over
an issue, which they can wield forcefully, or they do not. By contrast,
BG regulates the amplitude of shareholder power, permitting it to be
exercised frequently but with less consequence. Thus, shareholders will
be largely unable to act opportunistically, because they cannot force the
board to adopt any particular decision. Likewise, shareholders would
rarely find it profitable to disturb the company’s decision-making, as
only very costly (and thus egregiously bad) board policies would be
worth prohibiting. In other words, shareholders who can merely
circumscribe will very likely accept the board’s managerial vision, while
intervening only to reduce agency costs. At the same time, the broad
reach of shareholder power under BG (but not under ShEmp) means that
shirking insiders would find it hard to evade the shareholders’
proscriptions.113
The shareholder empowerment paradigm inaptly models corporate
governance as the allocation of a fixed amount of “power” between the
board and the equity holders. When Bebchuk writes about “Increasing
Shareholder Power”114 or when scholars debate the wisdom of giving
“more power” to shareholders,115 they assume that governance power is
112. We can assume that dissolution of the corporate entity would not in fact cause
the underlying businesses to liquidate, and thus the executives (and to a lesser extent,
the directors) may be able to continue their employment under different ownership.
However, managers and directors are typically heavily invested in the firm’s equity, see
supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text, and thus would stand to suffer a far greater
injury if the dissolution turns out poorly.
113. To see how this might work, suppose there is a CEO named B earning $100M a
year. ,$100M being extravagant, the shareholders obtain the power—a binding “say on
pay”—to limit her salary and settle on a sum of $25M a year. In response, B directs the
company to donate $75M to B’s alma mater, to which B was intending to donate
anyway. The donation might be in the company’s name, but the school understands the
identity of the real donor and agrees to name a new library after B. So B gets everything
she originally wanted, and the shareholders are powerless to stop it because they don’t
have a “say on donations.”
114. See Bebchuk, supra note 81.
115. See, e.g., Anabtawi, supra note 9, at 564-65 (arguing that “transferring power
from boards to shareholders . . . could reduce overall shareholder welfare”); Lynn A.
Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why Investors in
Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667, 671 (2003)
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finite and divisible. More power to shareholders means less power for
directors, and vice versa. This arithmetic concept of governance power
is mostly metaphorical, and does not account for different configurations
of governance power. If shareholders were given the right to redeem a
poison pill by majority vote, but lost the right to be reimbursed for proxy
contests, has their power “increased” or “decreased”? Does it even make
sense to ask that question?
This Article proposes that corporate governance is less about
quantities of power than it is about the possible outcomes of corporate
action. The business judgment rule empowers boards to establish goals
and choose means for implementing those goals from a very large set of
possible alternatives, all without fear of ex post reprisal by angry
shareholders. 116 Some of those alternatives are proscribed by corporate
law—for instance, by fiduciary duties or doctrines governing actions by
control shareholders—but we do not ordinarily think of such
proscriptions as neutering the board’s power. Why, then, would it
compromise the board’s discretion for shareholders to use bylaws to
further proscribe the board’s set of options, so long as the set remains
sufficiently large for the board to easily achieve its desired outcomes?
Such proscriptions will improve corporate governance when their value
to shareholders exceeds the cost of their imposition upon the board.
Since circumscribing bylaws, by definition, only minimally impact the
set of options from which the board can choose, they can improve
corporate governance—not by “increasing” shareholder power, but by
improving the quality of the board’s actions.
II. THE ENFORCEABILITY AND VALIDITY OF CIRCUMSCRIBING
BYLAWS IN DELAWARE
The leading bylaw authority in Delaware is the 2008 case CA, Inc.
v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan.117 There, the Court analyzed the
validity under Delaware law of a shareholder-proposed bylaw (the
“Reimbursement Bylaw”) that purported to require the board of
(arguing that when investors modify the default rules of corporate governance, “they
almost always . . . select[] charter provisions that strengthen director control over the
firm”).
116. Cf. Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc. 683 A.2d 1049, 1052-55 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(describing the business judgment rule as a way of encouraging directors to make risky
investments that, in aggregate, enrich the shareholders).
117. 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008).
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directors to reimburse the proxy expenses of any director who was
elected to the board while running on a “short slate”—i.e. a candidate
group numbering less than half the board seats.118 Procedurally, the CA
case came to the Court via a certification process in which the Court was
asked to answer two distinct questions. The first was whether the
Reimbursement Bylaw was a “proper subject” for shareholder bylaws,
which the Court interpreted as the question of whether the
Reimbursement Bylaw was within the “scope or reach” of the
shareholders’ § 109 residual bylaw power.119 The second question
concerned the interaction between § 109(b) and § 141(a), which as
discussed above in Part I.A., inheres in every inquiry about the validity
of any shareholder-enacted bylaw meant to be enforceable against the
board.120 Together, the two questions form a two-pronged test: Prong
One requires a bylaw to be within the scope of the bylaw power, and
Prong Two that it does not interfere with § 141(a).
The CA opinion failed to articulate coherent principles of bylaw
validity under either prong. As one of the justices later admitted, the
Court was rushed by the procedural posture of the case and its approach
to the case was “not necessarily the best way it could have been
handled.”121 The problem was not the outcome of the case, but rather
that the Court’s express reasoning failed to identify and discuss the
factors that it ultimately found to be dispositive. The Court framed the
Prong One issue as “whether [the bylaw] is one that establishes or
regulates a process for substantive director decision-making, or one that
mandates the decision itself,”122 but its actual Prong One analysis of the
Reimbursement Bylaw did not turn on process-orientation at all. On

118. Id. at 240. Normally, a bylaw is not needed for directors’ proxy contest
expenses to be reimbursed; directors who win control the board and will vote for
reimbursement. A short slate, however, does not have voting control, and can obtain
reimbursement only with approval of potentially hostile incumbent directors.
119. Id. at 231.
120. Id. at 231. Technically, the question certified was whether the Reimbursement
Bylaw would cause the Company to “violate any Delaware law.” Id. at 241. However,
the only law that was even implicated was § 141(a), and that was the law on which the
Court exclusively focused. Id.
121. See Ursaner, supra note 5, at 507-08 (recounting a talk given by Justice Jacobs
at Harvard Law School, in which he stated that “if we had more than two weeks and
were not under the pressure of time . . . we might have been able to write [the opinion]
better,” and admitted that the Court’s approach was not necessarily “the best way it
could have been handled”).
122. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 231.
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Prong Two, the Court relied on far-fetched hypotheticals123 to justify a
complex and unconvincing explanation of the relationship between the
shareholder bylaw power and the directors’ fiduciary duties.
A careful analysis of the opinion shows that the Court was really
interested in whether proposed bylaws are circumscribing or controlling.
The two prongs simply reflect two aspects of that inquiry. Section A
demonstrates that Prong One addresses the bylaw’s purpose—in
particular, whether that purpose was to circumscribe the board’s
discretion (in which case it would be a proper subject for shareholder
action) or to control or bind the board’s discretion (in which case it
would not). Section B shows that Prong Two deals with the bylaw’s
actual effect: it serves to invalidate any bylaws that are—whatever their
purpose—functionally controlling the board. As the Reimbursement
Bylaw was circumscribing in purpose but controlling in effect, the Court
upheld it on the first question but invalidated it on the second.
A. CA PRONG ONE: CIRCUMSCRIBING PURPOSE
The Court’s response to the first question was troubled from the
outset. As noted above, it characterized the issue as “whether [the
bylaw] is one that establishes or regulates a process for substantive
director decision-making, or one that mandates the decision itself.”124
This appears to be an attempt at a dichotomous classification, except
that its purported categories are different in kind and not close to
exhaustive. Circumscribing bylaws, for instance, are not necessarily
process-oriented, but they also do not mandate any decision by the
board. Conversely, it is possible for a bylaw to force a certain policy
upon the board via regulation of the decision-making process—for
instance, by requiring unanimous director consent for the company to
put in place a poison pill when one member of the board is staunchly
opposed to poison pills in principle.125 Classifying bylaws in this way is
123. Id. at 240 n.34. One of the more absurd hypotheticals was that of a competitor
of a company running a short slate of directors in order to gain access to the firm’s
sensitive internal information. Even if such a scenario did come to pass, the
reimbursement of the competitor’s proxy expenses would be a trifle compared with the
firm’s legal and financial costs.
124. Id. at 235 (emphasis added).
125. Cf. Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985) (upholding a
unanimous consent bylaw that had the effect of thwarting a substantive decision of the
board).
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analogous to dividing peppers into two categories: “spicy” or “green.”126
The taxonomy is not up to its assigned task.
Not surprisingly, the language of process and substance also fails to
accurately describe the case holding. After all, the Court held that the
Reimbursement Bylaw fell into the “process” category, even though it
did not even address any decision-making process at all. It was
apparently enough that the bylaw’s context involved process, and that its
substantive content addressed a “legitimate” substantive issue, as the
following excerpt expressly explains:
The context of the Bylaw at issue here is the process for electing
directors—a subject in which shareholders of Delaware corporations
have a legitimate and protected interest. The purpose of the Bylaw is
to promote the integrity of that electoral process by facilitating the
nomination of director candidates by stockholders or groups of
stockholders . . . . The Bylaw would encourage the nomination of
non-management board candidates by promising reimbursement of
the nominating stockholders’ proxy expenses if one or more of its
candidates are elected. In that the shareholders also have a legitimate
interest, because the Bylaw would facilitate the exercise of their
127
right to participate in selecting the contestants.

It is not hard to see that the Court never really engaged the concept
of process-orientation here. If bylaw validity turns on the legitimacy of
shareholder interests, then whether it regulates process is not a
dispositive factor. Nor should it be. For instance, a bylaw that required
the board to consult with shareholders before making any significant
business decision would be purely process-oriented, and yet one doubts
that the Court would consider that to be within the scope of bylaws.128
Moreover, the proffered distinction between process regulation and
substantive mandates would contravene a rarely-discussed clause of the
text of § 109(b). That section in full states that the “bylaws may contain
any provision . . . relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct
of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its
126. Of course, peppers can be both green and spicy, whereas red bell peppers are
neither.
127. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 237 (Del. 2008)
(emphasis added).
128. This “consultation bylaw” could only fail—as it must—under CA prong one.
Prong two focuses on the bylaw’s consistency with law. There is no statute in the
DGCL that would be violated by a requirement that the board listen to shareholders
before making a decision. Section 141(a) would be satisfied, since the board would still
make the decision, and thus would manage the firm’s business and affairs.
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stockholders, directors, officers or employees;”129 similarly, § 142(a)
commands that “the titles and duties” of the corporation’s officers are
specified by the bylaws.130 These provisions simply cannot be reconciled
with a rule that restricts bylaws to the establishment or regulation of
decision-making processes. Employees have no defined corporate
governance function or any default rights, so to the extent that a bylaw
“relates” to their “rights or powers,” it must do so by expanding or
abridging employees’ rights created by the board. Neither option is
process-oriented. A bylaw that defines the duties of the officers would
undoubtedly have a process dimension, since it would specify who
makes certain decisions. But one would be hard pressed to argue that it
would be only process-oriented; after all, if a bylaw confers upon the
corporate secretary the duty of taking attendance at board meetings, that
would seem to commit the board to the substantive policy of taking
attendance, which it might not want to do.
The Court’s confusion lies entirely in the first of the two proposed
categories. The second category—bylaws that “mandate the decision
itself”—simply refers to controlling bylaws. Logic thus suggests that the
first category really consists of circumscribing bylaws; then we would
have a dichotomy between controlling and circumscribing bylaws that is
both complete and coherent.131 This, in turn, explains the Court’s
approval of the Reimbursement Bylaw’s purpose. It did not seek to force
a particular policy on the board, but only to establish a threat of removal
sufficiently credible132 to encourage the board to engage shareholders’
concerns.133 Whether it remained fully true to that purpose was a
question reserved (and answered in the negative) for Prong Two.
A trace of this controlling/circumscribing logic is clearly visible in
the Court’s emphasis on the shareholders’ “legitimate and protected”
129.
130.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a) (“Every corporation organized under this
chapter shall have such officers with such titles and duties as shall be stated in the
bylaws . . . .”).
131. That is, all bylaws can be characterized as controlling or circumscribing, since
the latter is defined as the absence of the former, and by the same token, no bylaw can
fall into both categories.
132. For reasons discussed supra note 101 and accompanying text, removal of the
entire board is often not an attractive option for shareholders.
133. The Reimbursement Bylaw did ultimately fail as a circumscribing bylaw for
reasons discussed below in Part II.B. However, the purpose of establishing a credible
threat of director removal is circumscribing.
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interest. In Delaware, promoting the integrity of the electoral process
has long meant something more than protecting the casting of ballots—it
has occasioned substantive restrictions on the behavior of the board.134
For instance, directors may not intentionally interfere with the outcome
of a shareholder vote, at least on matters pertaining to the election
of directors, unless they can provide a compelling justification for doing
so.135 Nor can they buy votes or similarly use corporate funds to induce
shareholders to support their election. 136 These doctrines cannot be
characterized as either process-oriented or substantive: they at once
regulate electoral procedures and shape the powers and duties of the
board, via circumscription rather than control. The democracypromoting rule of Blasius, for instance, requires nothing of the board; it
merely invalidates a limited subset of possible board responses to a
hostile bid—namely intentional interference with a shareholder vote.137
By contrast, shareholder attempts to use Blasius to curtail the board’s
discretion have been rebuffed.138
It is also notable that the Court so heavily emphasized that the
shareholders’ bylaw power is no mere default rule. Twice it observed
that, per the express language of §109(b), the bylaw power cannot be
eliminated or even narrowed by the certificate of incorporation;139 and
then added an additional footnote “to reiterate” the salience of the
relevant statutory language.140 As argued above in Part I.A., the
inalienability of the bylaw power strongly indicates that it was intended

134.
135.

See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
See MM Co. v. Liquid Audio, Inc. 813 A.2d 1118, 1131 (Del. 2003)
(upholding the Blasius rule that the board may not “act with the primary purpose . . . of
impeding . . . the franchise” unless it can present a “compelling justification” for doing
so).
136. See, e.g., Portnoy v. Cryo-Cell Int’l, 940 A.2d 43, 73-74 (Del. Ch. 2008)
(holding that “the use of a corporate asset . . . by the management slate to secure a vote
for itself” is a breach of fiduciary duty); Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17 (Del. Ch.
1982) (subjecting vote buying transactions to a rigorous test of entire fairness). Of
course, the board may use corporate money to persuade shareholders to vote for them.
The line between advocacy and purchase is a thin one that has not yet been resolved.
137. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).
138. See, e.g., Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992) (holding that Blasius does
not restrict the board’s power to reject unqualified nominees to the board, even if
replacement nominees are not permitted).
139. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 231 (Del. 2008); for
the statutory text, see supra note 28 and accompanying text.
140. CA, Inc., 953 A.3d at 234 n.13.
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to protect an important interest.141 It is hard to believe that the Court
would so heavily emphasize that the bylaw power cannot be curtailed if
it really conceived of bylaws as trivial lists of logistical procedures. It
clearly contemplated a more significant principle,142 even if it could not
precisely articulate what it had in mind.
Other bylaw cases also support the distinction between
circumscribing and controlling, as well as make clear that the operative
principle of bylaw validity applies outside the narrow context of
electoral procedures. For instance, in Frantz Manufacturing. Co. v. EAC
Industries143 incumbent management was attempting to issue equity to
an entity it controlled so as to wrest control away from an investor that
had newly acquired a majority share of the company’s stock.144 In a
response approved by the Court, the new controlling shareholder
amended the bylaws to block this action.145 In Airgas, Inc. v. Air
Products, Inc.,146 the shareholders attempted to give themselves a notentirely-illusory ability to vote in favor of a hostile tender offer and thus
circumvent the board’s de facto insuperable defense of “just saying
never.”147 This circumscribing bylaw was ultimately invalidated, but not
141.
142.

See text accompanying notes 36-48.
CA, Inc., 953 A.3d at 234. To be sure, the inalienability of the bylaw power
does not, in itself, offer any rule of decision, nor did the Court imply that it could. See
id. at 234 (noting that the language of § 109(b) is “only marginally helpful in
determining what the Delaware legislature intended to be the lawful scope of the
shareholders’ power to adopt, amend and repeal bylaws”).
143. 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985).
144. Id. at 407.
145. See id. (noting that “the bylaw amendments were a permissible part of EAC’s
attempt to avoid its disenfranchisement as a majority shareholder”). In this case, the
shareholder already had one seat on the board, and so it could achieve a veto over any
disenfranchisement by means of an arguably procedural bylaw that prohibited the board
from acting without unanimous consent of all members.
146. 8 A.3d 1182 (2010).
147. Id. at 1187. The bylaw would have moved an annual meeting of Airgas to a
date in January, only four months after the prior year’s annual meeting at which a third
of the incumbent directors were replaced. Id. The purpose of the bylaw was to hasten a
vote to replace another third (and create a majority on the board in favor of the
acquisition by Air Products) before Air Products would be forced to withdraw its offer.
Id. at 1187-88. Without such accelerated voting, hostile bids are hopeless: the defense
mechanism of a poison pill plus a classified board has never been defeated. As the
Chancery Court held in a subsequent opinion, “just saying never” is beyond the
legitimate power of the board. See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d
48, 127-29 (Del. Ch. 2011).
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because it exceeded the shareholders’ authority; it merely contradicted
an explicit charter provision, and presumably would have been valid
under a different charter.148 In short, bylaws have been found to fall
within the scope of § 109(b) when their purpose is to prevent the board’s
from defeating legitimate shareholder interests—regardless of whether
the bylaws are process-oriented or pertain to elections.
It is instructive to examine Frantz in more detail. In that case, the
board attempted to issue equity to an entity it controlled in order to
dilute the voting power of a shareholder who had just obtained a
controlling stake.149 The shareholder amended the bylaws to require
unanimous consent among directors for any corporate action—a strategy
that was effective in blocking the equity issuance, because the newly
controlling shareholder had already been seated and could veto that
action.150 Thus, the shareholder was protected by a “procedural” bylaw.
Suppose, by contrast, that the shareholder had not yet been seated on the
board. Does the corporate law really prevent such an investor from using
a bylaw to prevent the board from diluting his or her voting power?151 It
148. Airgas, Inc., 8 A.3d at 1186-87. To be specific, the corporate charter provided
that a given class of directors would serve until the “annual meeting of stockholders to
be held in the third year following the year of their election.” Id. at 1188. In practice
this had always meant that directors served three-year terms, and the Court found the
provision to be ambiguous as to whether the directors’ terms could be shortened by
moving the date of the annual meeting. Id. Because charters are in the nature of a
contract, the court used methods of contract interpretation to determine the intent of the
drafting parties, which was to establish three-year terms. Id. at 1190. Hence a bylaw
shortening the tenure of one class to 28 months (see supra note 147) conflicted with the
certificate and was therefore invalid. Airgas, Inc., 8 A.3d at 1188-93. Importantly, the
Court’s reasoning relied exclusively on the law of contract interpretation. Id. at 119092. Nowhere in the opinion does the Court exhibit any doubt that the bylaw was a
proper exercise of the § 109(b) power. Id. at 1188-93. Had the certificate clearly
indicated that the directors’ terms lasted only until the annual meeting date—for
instance, if the certificate stated that directors were ‘elected to hold office for a term of
variable length expiring on the date of the third annual meeting after their election,’—
the bylaw would have been valid. Id.
149. Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401, 402 (Del. 1985).
150. Id. at 402-03.
151. A shareholder diluted in this way would likely sue the board for breach of duty.
Whether that suit would be effective, though, is highly uncertain. The closest case on
point—Benihana of Tokyo v. Benihana, 906 A.2d 114 (Del. 2006)—would cut against
a challenge to the equity issuance. There, the board issued new equity in such a way as
to destroy the majority control held by the plaintiff-shareholder, and with it any real
threat to the board’s job security. Id. at 116-17. The trial court had found that the board
did not act with an entrenching purpose, even though two board members had discussed
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seems more likely that the Court would approve a bylaw functionally
equivalent to the Frantz procedural trick—for instance, something
similar to the No First Vote bylaw described above, which prevents
newly issued equity from voting in the first meeting after issuance152—
without regard to its “substantive” nature.
Indeed, No First Vote fits very comfortably within the explanation
given in CA for why the Reimbursement Bylaw was within the scope of
the § 109(b) power. To again recite that language:
The context of the Bylaw at issue here is the process for electing
directors—a subject in which shareholders of Delaware corporations
have a legitimate and protected interest. The purpose of the Bylaw is
to promote the integrity of that electoral process by facilitating the
nomination of director candidates by stockholders or groups of
153
stockholders.

Each of the last two sentences applies easily to No First Vote, and
arguably with greater force than to the Reimbursement Bylaw. Surely a
majority shareholder has an even more legitimate and protected interest
in removing (by proxy vote) directors who would try to deprive it of its
majority stake. Similarly, it would promote the integrity of the electoral
process to prevent management from tipping the outcome by issuing
new equity to an entity it controls (or a friendly third party) just in
advance of the election.154 In other words, No First Vote satisfies the
issuing equity for just such a purpose but a few months before. Id. at 121-22. The Court
accepted these conclusions, again without questioning the board’s motives. Id. The
point here is not that Benihana was incorrectly decided, but rather a much simpler
point: majority shareholders can not really count on the courts to protect their majority
stake against dilutive actions by a hostile board.
152. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
153. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 237 (Del. 2008).
Recall also the statement that concluded the previous paragraph in that opinion:
“[w]hether or not a bylaw is process-related must necessarily be determined in light of
its context and purpose.” Id. at 236-37.
154. Cf. Portnoy v. Cryo-Cell Int’l, 940 A.2d 43 (Del. Ch. 2008). In this case, the
incumbent board, in response to a proxy contest it was losing, the board conferred
company assets—in that case, a second seat on the board—to shareholders who
purchased shares in the open market and voted for the incumbent slate. Id. at *46-48.
The Chancery Court invalidated this vote-buying arrangement. Id. While Portnoy does
not express the issuance of new equity, it is not a long throw from rewarding a
shareholder with a board seat for buying shares, and selling newly issued equity to a
white knight.

2015]

BYLAW GOVERNANCE

439

articulated standard—or the closest thing to a standard that the Delaware
courts have issued—for bylaw validity under Prong One, though it is not
a process-oriented provision. It does so because it barely imposes on the
board’s discretion. By any measure, it simply offers to all majority
shareholders the anti-dilution protection fortuitously (at least in part)
available to the Frantz shareholder by virtue of being seated before the
other board members initiated their mischief.
Here another advantage of BG becomes apparent: it permits
shareholders to protect themselves ex ante, rather than relying on
expensive litigation to seek protection from the courts. The board’s antidilution efforts in Frantz were bound to fail. The Frantz court strongly
implied that it would have upheld the majority shareholder’s rights if,
lacking a bylaw in its favor, it had run to court alleging impermissible
entrenchment.155 The remedy would have been in equity under the
venerable rule of Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. that “inequitable
action does not become permissible simply because it is legally
possible.”156 If this were going to be the outcome, then why not permit
the shareholder to use the mechanism that leads to the lowest transaction
costs? Judicial resolution of the issue is expensive; bylaw resolution
would be cheap, as soon as Delaware articulates an express, coherent
standard for bylaw validity.
B. CA PRONG TWO: CIRCUMSCRIBING EFFECT
The test of Prong One—whether the proposed bylaw is a “proper
subject” for bylaws by virtue of circumscribing purpose—is merely the
first half of the overall question of bylaw validity. Section 109(b) also
requires that bylaws cannot be “inconsistent with law or the certificate
of incorporation.” The “law” that cannot be contravened includes the
delegation of managerial authority to the board of directors under §
141(a)—which is to say that bylaws can be invalid simply by too deeply
infringing upon managerial duties and prerogatives.157 In fact, before
155. Of course, Frantz was decided many years before the unfavorable precedent of
Benihana, discussed supra note 151. Thus, the landscape is murkier now. To be sure, a
diluted majority shareholder would not be without favorable precedent, but more
certain protection for the investor’s property right would be better.
156. 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971).
157. See, e.g., Quickturn Design Sys. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1291 (Del. 1998)
(invalidating provision that would “impermissibly deprive any newly elected board of
both its statutory authority to manage the corporation under 8 Del. C. § 141(a) and its
concomitant fiduciary duty pursuant to that statutory mandate”).
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CA, this limitation on bylaw validity was almost the exclusive focus of
academic commentary.158 In light of the lack of clear guidance from the
courts, commentators were left either to attempt to extract a bit of
sustenance from the barren statutory edifice,159 and/or to speculate about
where the corporate law would (or should) draw the line between
permissible and impermissible infringements upon managerial
prerogatives.160 Fortunately, courtesy of CA, we now have the benefit of
explicit guidance from the Court, though it requires careful scrutiny.
This guidance tells us that the theory of inconsistency in Prong Two
merely extends the “scope or reach” inquiry, testing whether a bylaw
intended to be circumscribing actually operates as such.
As noted previously, the question addressed in CA was the validity
of a controlling bylaw that required the board to reimburse certain proxy
contest expenses. The Court was concerned that the command of the
bylaws would force the board to act contrary to its fiduciary duties. In
particular, it would require reimbursements that no board could possibly
authorize in good faith, such as when “the proxy contest is motivated by
personal or petty concerns, or promote[s] interests that do not further, or
are adverse to, those of the corporation.”161
The Court’s focus on the action-forcing nature of the
Reimbursement Bylaw was so complete that it seemed unable to provide
another reasonable example of how the bylaw’s command would
interfere with the board’s fiduciary duties. It offered the far-fetched162
hypothetical of a competitor running a director slate in order to gain
158. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV & Bradley Faris, supra note 1, at 1329-30 (arguing
that the § 141(a) prohibition on measures that restrict the board’s exercise of fiduciary
duties “bodes ill” for the prospective validity of bylaws); id. at 1329 n.28 (listing
articles that analyze the validity of bylaws under § 141(a)).
159. See, e.g., Brent H. McDonnell, supra note 10 (attempting to find a general
pattern in the statutory provisions that specifically authorize bylaw resolution of certain
topics); Gordon, supra note 1, at 546 (noting that sections 109(b) and 141(a) form a
“recursive loop” in which each section confers power on the board or the bylaws except
as provided by the other, thus permitting any division of authority between bylaws and
the board to be consistent with the statutes).
160. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 34, at 614.
161. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 240 (Del. 2008).
162. See Ursaner, supra note 5, at 546. The fact that the Court had to rely on such a
far-fetched hypothetical also suggests that it went too far in declaring the bylaw to be
facially invalid. Id. It could just as easily have upheld the bylaw as valid on its face, and
potentially invalid as applied to any situation where it might have required directors to
breach their fiduciary duties.
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access to the confidential information that comes with board
representation.163 Surely this scenario borders on the absurd: it is
inconceivable that a competitor could ever be successful in such an
endeavor, and if it somehow pulled it off, the reimbursement of its proxy
expenses would be far from the most pressing concern of either the
company or the corporate law.164 The use of such a hypothetical
suggests that the Court did not want to imply invalidity for any bylaw
that did not mandate reimbursement. If it had so intended, it could
simply have reasoned that (1) the board exercises its business judgment
over proxy reimbursement, and thus (2) it could deny reimbursement for
any reason it deemed appropriate. No absurd fact patterns would be
required—only a simple explanation that bylaws cannot have any
constraining effect on the board’s decision making. The fact that it
eschewed that simple reasoning strongly suggests that it was articulating
a distinction between (invalid) controlling bylaws and (presumably
valid) circumscribing ones.
More support for this interpretation comes from the Court’s
analogy of the Reimbursement Bylaw to “contractual arrangements that
commit the board of directors to a course of action that would preclude
them from fully discharging their fiduciary duties.”165 As this language
indicates, these contractual arrangements tend to be controlling
restrictions; in cases like Paramount,166 Omnicare,167 and Capital Re,168
boards had tried to bind themselves to merger transactions,169 much as
163.
164.

CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 240 n.34.
If it were even remotely possible for shareholders to elect such “Manchurian
candidates” to the board, one might wonder if the shareholder franchise is worth the
“assiduous” protection it currently receives. See MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813
A.2d 1118, 1127 (Del. 2003). One might also suspect that the courts would be able to
prevent such directors from being seated. As the Delaware courts note from time to
time, “inequitable action does not become permissible simply because it is legally
possible.” See, e.g., Hollinger Int’l v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1078 (Del. Ch. 2004)
(citing Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971)). In other
words, multiple systems would have to suffer complete failure before the situation the
Court hypothesizes could even arise.
165. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 238 (emphasis added).
166. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
167. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).
168. ACE Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95 (Del. Ch. 1999).
169. In each case, the acquiring company forced the target to finalize the merger by
making it legally impossible for the target to accept another offer. In Paramount, the
merger agreement contained a “no shop” provision prohibiting the target from
discussing any third party bid unless it was unsolicited and fully financed; in Capital
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the Reimbursement Bylaw tried to bind the board to a certain type of
financial transaction. As those controlling restrictions were invalid, so
too would be controlling bylaws.
Unfortunately, there’s a catch that must be explained. The CA
Court also analogized the Reimbursement Bylaw to the slow-hand
poison pill, a seemingly circumscribing limitation on board power that
was invalidated in Quickturn.170 The slow-hand pill prohibited the board
from redeeming the pill during the six-month period following a change
of control in the company,171 but otherwise left the board completely
free to engage in any other type of strategic business transaction.172 Its
purpose was to protect existing directors (who, by refusing to redeem
the company’s poison pill, were thwarting an acquisition attempt) from
being removed from office in a proxy contest sponsored by a frustrated
hostile bidder.173 While a slow-hand pill would not offer ironclad
protection,174 the delay would further lengthen the acquisition process,
increase its cost, and thus discourage takeover bids.
If Quickturn really intended to apply broadly to any circumscribing
self-disablement of board power (and if CA really intended to extend the
analogy between the slow-hand pill and the Reimbursement Bylaw that
far), then BG argument would be in some danger. But two critical and
distinctive features of the slow-hand pill explain Quickturn’s holding,
and counsel strongly in favor of a narrow reading of that case. First, the
Re, the merger agreement permitted the target to entertain other bids only if outside
counsel opined that the board’s fiduciary duties so required; and in Omnicare, the target
was required to put the merger agreement to the shareholders’ vote, the majority of
which had already been committed in favor of the merger. Each target board was
effectively bound, with no real ability to pursue any other course of action.
170. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1291-92 (Del. 1998).
171. See id. at 1287-88. Technically, it only prohibits the pill from being redeemed
in order to facilitate a transaction with the person who sponsored the proxy context. If a
new bidder emerged, the board could redeem the pill to permit that transaction to
proceed.
172. Id. at 1291-92.
173. Id. at 1283.
174. The protection was less than total because the bidder could still elect new
directors who, after six months, would presumably redeem the pill. But as Air Products
discovered in its attempted hostile takeover of Airgas, bidder-nominated directors do
not always do the bidder’s bidding. See Air Products, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48,
89 (Del. Ch. 2011) (noting that the three directors nominated by Air Products and
elected in a subsequent proxy contest voted with the incumbent board members to reject
Air Products’ offer and to maintain Airgas’ poison pill).

2015]

BYLAW GOVERNANCE

443

slow-hand pill relied on a contract with shareholders to restrict the
board’s authority to redeem it.175 That is, it embedded the slow-hand
feature into the contractual terms of the shareholder “rights” distributed
to shareholders in the poison pill.176 It would have been simpler for the
board to bind itself with a bylaw or resolution requiring a six-month
wait before redemption, but any such provision could be reversed by the
bidder’s board after a successful proxy contest. Hence, the slow-hand
feature had to be embedded in a contract that the new directors could not
unilaterally alter. Only then would it have any meaningful deterrent
effect.
Functionally speaking, then, the slow-hand pill was an effort by the
board of directors to manufacture for itself a power specifically denied
to it by the corporate law. Not only does the DGCL not provide any
means for a board to bind itself, but a line of precedent dating back
almost a century holds unambiguously that directors may not
contractually burden their vote as directors, either to each other, to the
shareholders or to a third party.177 The slow-hand pill purported to avoid
this problem by permitting the board to use the corporation’s contract
power as an almost perfect substitute for the vote-binding power denied
to individual directors. Thus, in invalidating the slow-hand pill, the
Court correctly invoked § 141(a)—i.e. the original grant of power to the
board.178 In doing so, the Court focused on a slightly different facet of
175.
176.

See Quickturn, 721 A.2d at 1292.
A poison pill consists of a set of warrants distributed via dividend to
shareholders that permit the shareholders to purchase of a large number of stock shares
at a discount price in the event that any person or group of people acquires a large block
of stock. The blockholder, however, is not permitted to exercise this option. As a result,
when other shareholders exercise their options, the new blockholder will be diluted at a
steep financial loss. The warrants distributed as part of the pill contain a number of
contractual terms, including a provision for redemption by the board—and, in the case
of the slow-hand pill, a slow-hand feature. For a detailed description of a poison pill,
see Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1352-61 (Del. 1985).
177. See, e.g., Abercrombie v. Davies, 123 A.2d 893, 899 (Del. Ch. 1956), rev’d on
other grounds, 130 A.2d 338 (Del. 1957) (holding that “this Court cannot give legal
sanction to agreements which have the effect of removing from directors in a very
substantial way their duty to use their own best judgment on management matters”);
Chapin v. Benwood Foundation, 402 A.2d 1205, 1206, 1211 (Del. Ch. 1979)
(invalidating an attempt by a board to “legally bind itself in advance to name designated
persons to fill vacancies on the board of trustees as such vacancies occur” because
directors may not alienate their duty to use their best business judgment); cf. McQuade
v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 331 (1934) (prohibiting directors from agreeing ex ante to
retain the services of a corporate officer).
178. See Quickturn, 721 A.2d at 1291-92.
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the slow-hand chicanery: that the pill attempted to limit the board’s
power by directorial fiat, when the law clearly requires that any such
limitations be set forth in the certificate.179 But the fundamental
deficiency is the same no matter what specific theory is invoked: the
slow-hand pill attempted to arrogate to the board a power it did not
have.
It follows, then, that Quickturn has little direct bearing on the
validity of shareholder-approved bylaws. The bylaws, after all, are
passed pursuant to § 109(b), which expressly authorizes the shareholders
to do what the board cannot: contravene the business judgment of the
board on some matters. The central issue in bylaw validity is not
whether the board’s discretion can be circumscribed, but rather the
extent to which it can be circumscribed.180 To put the issue differently,
the § 141(a) limiting provision undergirding Quickturn thrusts in a
different direction from the limiting provision of § 109(b). The former
countenances any substantive reduction of the board’s discretion, but
requires a specific and relatively demanding procedure to be followed—
i.e. certificate amendment. Section 109(b), by contrast, says nothing of
procedure, but countenances a much narrower set of restrictions on the
board. That Quickturn found a procedural deficiency in the board’s
disablement does not imply anything about whether a bylaw would
impermissibly encroach on the board’s powers.
Why, then, did the CA court cite to Quickturn and analogize the
bylaw to the slow-hand pill? The Court appeared to be focusing on an
important common feature of the slow-hand pill and the bylaw: both
tightly constrained the board’s discretion over matters to which they
applied. Indeed, the whole passage from the opinion reads:
Quickturn involved [a] binding contractual arrangement[] that the
board of directors had voluntarily imposed upon themselves. This
case involves a binding bylaw that the shareholders seek to impose
involuntarily on the directors in the specific area of election expense
179. See id. at 1291 (holding that “[s]ection 141(a) requires that any limitation on
the board’s authority be set out in the certificate of incorporation”).
180. To reiterate, if bylaws cannot circumscribe the board’s discretion at all, then
they would have no legal effect. They would be functionally equivalent to shareholder
resolutions. See, e.g., Hollinger Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1080 (Del. Ch.
2004). Such a legal characterization would make a mockery of legislature’s decision to
make the bylaw power inviolable. In any event, the DGCL specifically authorizes
bylaws to circumscribe the board’s direction in many provisions, and the courts have
held that the board’s power can be limited by valid bylaws. Id. at 1077-80.
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reimbursement. Although this case is distinguishable in that respect,
the distinction is one without a difference. The reason is that the
internal governance contract—which here takes the form of a
bylaw—is one that would also prevent the directors from exercising
their full managerial power in circumstances where their fiduciary
duties would otherwise require them to deny reimbursement to a
181
dissident slate.

Crucially, the Court here relies on the mandatory nature of the
reimbursement bylaw, and specifically that it requires the board to act a
certain way independent of the factual context.182 As the Court explains,
the distinction between contractual binding and bylaw binding is
“without a difference” because in both cases, the directors retain no
discretion to exercise any business judgment.183
Here the Court invokes the second feature of the slow-hand pill that
should render Quickturn inapplicable to circumscribing bylaws: the
slow-hand pill may have been circumscribing in form, but it was
controlling in substance. That the slow-hand pill excessively constrained
the board’s discretion was made amply clear in Quickturn itself:
This Court has held ‘to the extent that a contract, or a provision
thereof, purports to require a board to act or not act in such a fashion
as to limit the exercise of fiduciary duties, it is invalid and
184
unenforceable.’ . . . .
The Delayed Redemption Provision would prevent a new Quickturn
board of directors from . . . redeeming the Rights Plan to facilitate a
transaction that would serve the stockholders’ best interests, even
under circumstances where the board would be required to do so
185
because of its fiduciary duty.

The Court did not use the “require” language carelessly. Generally
speaking, a hostile bidder that goes so far as to mount a proxy contest
will be the only party interested in paying full value for the target
company.186 Thus, in most hostile bids, the only options are ‘no sale’ or
181. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 239 (Del. 2008)
(emphasis added).
182. Id. at 239.
183. Id.
184. Quickturn, 721 A.2d at 1292 (emphasis added).
185. Id. at 1292-93 (emphasis added).
186. It is always possible that a new bidder could emerge with a superior bid. In
such a case, however, the slow-hand feature would bind the board’s discretion in a
different way entirely; the board would be unable to conduct an auction contest between
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‘sale to the hostile bidder.’ By taking the latter off the table, the slowhand pill would have effectively bound the directors to the ‘no sale’
option—even if their fiduciary duties would have required them to
complete the transaction.
A true circumscribing bylaw, by contrast, permits the board to
pursue a variety of strategies not only in theory, but in fact as well.
Thus, neither of the factors on which Quickturn turned—the use of
contracts to invent a procedure for the board to bind itself and the
heavily binding nature of the restriction itself—would be applicable.
The relevance of Quickturn to circumscribing bylaw rests in its
demonstration that the Court will pursue a substance-over-form analysis
in analyzing restrictions on board power. Indeed, this same point was
made in the CA scope or reach analysis, where the Court wrote:
Because the Bylaw is couched as a command to reimburse (“The
board of directors shall cause the corporation to reimburse a
stockholder”), it lends itself to CA’s criticism. But the Bylaw’s
wording, although relevant, is not dispositive of whether or not it is
process-related. The Bylaw could easily have been worded
differently, to emphasize its process, as distinguished from its
mandatory payment, component. By saying this we do not mean to
suggest that this Bylaw’s reimbursement component can be
187
ignored.

In short, the effect of a provision cannot be determined from its
face.
One loose end still remains: the phrase “full managerial power” in
the excerpt cited above.188 When the Court explained the invalidity of
the Reimbursement Bylaw as a matter of preventing “the directors from
exercising their full managerial power in circumstances where their
fiduciary duties would otherwise require them” to act differently, did
the Court mean to imply that all of the board’s once-extant powers must
remain permanently available?189 It likely did not; if that was in fact the
the two bidders, as its ability to close a transaction with the first bidder would be
disabled. See Gordon, supra note 1, at 533-34. Furthermore, since the new bid is a
superior offer, the board would likely breach its Revlon duties by rejecting it. Thus, the
slow-hand feature would bind the board a single course of action: accepting the new bid
on the terms initially proposed.
187. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 236 (Del. 2008).
188. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 181.
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law, a company could, for instance, never commit to specific
performance in a contract, as doing so would require directors to
alienate their power to efficiently breach. Furthermore, the words “full
power” do not normally imply that an actor possesses all theoretically
available powers, but rather only those powers needed to do something
in particular. Indeed, in the last forty years, the Delaware Supreme Court
has used the phrase “full power” in fifteen other cases;190 in every single
one, it described someone having the “full power . . . to” achieve some
end.191 In many of those cases, the Court was referring to a board
delegating its “full power” to a committee of the board, in which cases
the “full power” being delegated was necessarily less than the absolute
sum of the board’s powers.192 In short, the phrase “full managerial
power” is subject to an implied qualifier, without which it lacks an
ascertainable meaning.
The most logical reading is that “full managerial power” implies
the need for a substance-over-form analysis, designed to make sure that
the board retains its discretion in fact, and not just in form. The “full
power” formulation originated in Quickturn, where the Court explained
that the slow-hand pill was invalid because it “prevents a newly elected
board of directors from completely discharging its fiduciary duties to
protect fully the interests” of the company and its shareholders.193 This
less opaque passage reveals the issues about which the Court was
principally concerned. Recall that the slow-hand pill purported to permit
the board to freely exercise its discretion in all respects other than
redeeming the pill. But the Court considered that discretion illusory,
taking away the most important power (pill redemption) without

190. I am examining the Court’s usage, and thus not including cases where the
phrase “full power” only appeared in a quoted document.
191. See, e.g., Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845
A.2d 1040, 1055 (Del. 2004) (describing how a special litigation committee often “is
vested with the full power of the board to conduct an extensive investigation) (emphasis
added); In re Appeal of Infotechnology, Inc., 582 A.2d 215, 221 (Del. 1990) (noting
that a trial court has “full power to employ the substantive and procedural remedies
available to properly control the parties and counsel before it”) (emphasis added).
192. Some of the powers of the board cannot be delegated to a committee. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c)(2) (2014) (noting that the board may not delegate to a
committee the power to amend the bylaws or any power “in reference to . . . approving
or adopting, or recommending to the stockholders, any action or matter . . . expressly
required . . . to be submitted to stockholders for approval”).
193. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1292 (Del. 1998).
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providing an effective substitute for permitting a merger to proceed.194
In other words, the board could not fully protect the shareholders
because it could not enable them to take advantage of an adequate
takeover offer—or, put another way, the board would be unable to
completely discharge its duties because it was “prevent[ed] . . . from . . .
facilitat[ing] a transaction that would serve the stockholders’ best
interests, even under circumstances where the board would be required
to do so.”195
In other words, the language of “full managerial power” and
“completely discharging” is fully consistent with the central concept of
BG. The board’s power may be circumscribed, but only if its ability to
effectively exercise its business judgment is preserved. As CA noted,
whether the disablement comes from the board or from the shareholders
is irrelevant196—what matters is that the board has latitude to pursue its
ends by reasonably substitutable means.
C. POST-CA DEVELOPMENTS
Though CA remains the leading case on bylaw validity, its
influence may be dwindling. As a formal matter, it has not been
overturned, modified, or even questioned by any Delaware court. It was
also notably absent in the most recent bylaw case decided by the
Delaware Supreme Court: ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund.197
Like CA, ATP decided certified questions referred to the Court from a
federal authority. Unlike CA, ATP said as little as possible. It is a
minimalist opinion holding that fee-shifting bylaws—i.e. bylaws that
require plaintiff shareholders to reimburse corporations for costs and
fees incurred in defending unsuccessful litigation198—are not facially
194. See id. at 1291-92 (explaining that while the slow-hand pill “limits the board of
directors’ authority in only one respect . . . it nonetheless restricts the board’s power in
an area of fundamental importance to the shareholders—negotiating a possible sale of
the corporation”).
195. Id. at 1292-93.
196. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
197. 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014).
198. Technically, the defendant corporation in ATP was non-stock, and the certified
question made reference to that technicality. Id. at 557. The Court, however, very
quickly made clear that the same rules apply to both types of organizations. Id. at 557
n.10 (“[T]he provisions of the Delaware General Corporation Law, including § 109(b),
apply to non-stock corporations and all references to the stockholders of a corporation
are deemed to apply to the members of a non-stock corporation.”).
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invalid. That is, such bylaws fall within the scope of § 109(b). ATP also
reminded the federal district court of the long-standing principle that
bylaws need not be enforced if they were adopted for improper purposes
or if their enforcement would operate inequitably in a specific case.199
The opinion did not elaborate upon that basic hornbook rule.
It is impossible that the Court failed to notice the obvious tension
between the outcomes in ATP and CA. ATP instructed the district court
to do precisely what the Court itself did not do in CA: uphold and
enforce a bylaw despite the possibility that a situation might arise in
which the bylaw could operate invalidly or inequitably. It is also highly
unlikely that the Court intended to overrule CA sub silentio. ATP did not
purport to articulate any new rules of law; much of its analysis simply
restated the facts and holdings of old cases such as Schnell v. ChrisCraft Industries and Frantz Manufacturing.200 Moreover, the procedural
context renders a silent overturning almost unthinkable. The
certification process exists so that state courts can clarify their law to the
federal courts that need to apply it; it would make no sense for the
Delaware Supreme Court to have used this particular occasion to
confuse everyone else. Until we are given a more explicit statement, we
must assume that ATP and CA are meant to be consistent.
The distinction between circumscribing and controlling bylaws
offers one way of harmonizing the two decisions. The bylaw in ATP did
not require any action by the board, and thus could not at all
compromise the directors’ discretion. In fact, the ATP bylaw did not
even apply to board action at all. The distinction between CA and ATP is
likely not so simple as the difference between a bylaw that does or does
not affect the board. As mentioned above, ATP approvingly cited to
Frantz and Hollinger International v. Black, cases addressing bylaws
that restricted board action. Of course, one might attribute this
inconsistency in the case law to outcome-orientation on the part of the
courts. It would not be unfair to characterize the Delaware courts as
currently enthusiastic about bylaws that attempt to reduce a company’s
litigation costs.201 The CA court, by contrast, did not bother to recount
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 558.
Id.
In 2013, the Chancery Court upheld forum-selection bylaws that required
shareholder derivative suits to be heard in Delaware courts. See Boilermakers Local 154
Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013). As the court approvingly
explained, such bylaws intend to eliminate the costs to the company of multi-forum
litigation. Fee-shifting bylaws also attempt to reduce litigation costs, by making the
litigation more risky for the plaintiffs.
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any laudable effects that might have resulted from the Reimbursement
Bylaw. It is hardly implausible that the tension between the cases is the
product of this enthusiasm gap. This Article, though, takes legal
reasoning seriously; on that level, the distinction between
circumscribing and controlling bylaws seems to account well enough for
the tension between the two cases.
The interpretation of CA proposed by this Article is also consistent
with an observation by Vice Chancellor Laster in Klaassen v. Allegro
Development Corporation.202 In discussing the effect of the board’s
failure to notice a meeting as required in the bylaws, the ViceChancellor cited what he saw as:
[T]he general rule that the stockholders, through bylaws, may dictate
the process that directors use to manage the corporation, so long as
the restrictions are not so onerous as to interfere with the board’s
203
power to manage the corporation under Section 141(a).

To be sure, “onerous” is not the most precise of expressions; the
Vice Chancellor appears to be using the word as a synonym for
“discretion-limiting,” as discretion-limiting restrictions would in fact
interfere with the board’s power. Thus, the Vice Chancellor recites one
of the central assertions of bylaw governance and the circumscribing
bylaw theory: that the shareholders’ bylaw power is not defined by
subject matter (i.e. meeting dates, quorum, etc.) but rather by the degree
of interference with the board’s managerial discretion. That he cited CA
in support of this “general rule” supports the interpretation of that case
offered in this Article. However, I will stop short of contending that the
Vice Chancellor endorses bylaw governance. It is enough to say that his
perception of the corporate law is consistent with BG theory.204
D. UNISUPER’S (EVENTUAL) ACCEPTANCE OF CIRCUMSCRIBING BOARD
RESTRICTIONS
The previous section demonstrated that CA and other relevant
Delaware precedent can be interpreted to validate circumscribing
bylaws. The courts have also addressed—and validated—corporate
202.
203.
204.

No. 8626-VCL, 2013 WL 5739680 (Del. Ch. Oct. 11, 2013).
Id. at *19.
It is not consistent with every theory. Advocates of director primacy likely take
issue with Laster’s formulation and contest that it constitutes any sort of general rule.
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actions that are functionally equivalent to circumscribing bylaws. This
suggests that the BG theory is firmly established within Delaware
corporate law, and is not merely the product of a single opinion.
The most interesting of these precedents is the pair of opinions
issued by Chancellor Chandler in UniSuper, Ltd v. News Corp.205 The
first opinion in the case (“UniSuper”)206 was the Chancellor’s original
ruling on the defendant corporation’s motion to dismiss. The second
opinion (“UniSuper I-L”)207 certified the first decision for interlocutory
review by the Delaware Supreme Court. The first opinion used
reasoning that neither engaged nor commented upon the concept of
board circumscription, but that reasoning proved deficient in a number
of ways. Perhaps for that reason, UniSuper I-L largely jettisoned the
arguments on which UniSuper relied. The UniSuper I-L opinion—which
the Delaware Supreme Court left undisturbed by declining an
interlocutory appeal—analyzed the case as a question of whether the
board’s discretion. In defending his original opinion, the Chancellor in
essence confirmed the validity of circumscribing bylaws, even as
applied to substantive managerial issues.
The facts of the case revolved around a contract between News
Corp. and a group of its Australian institutional shareholders. In that
contract, News Corp. had assumed certain corporate governance
responsibilities in exchange for the shareholders’ assent to its
reincorporation in Delaware.208 One of the terms of that contract was a

205. The first opinion was the original decision on the defendant’s motion to
dismiss, and can be found at 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 205 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2005). The
second opinion 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 2006) certified the decision
for interlocutory review.
206. No. 1699-N, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 205 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2005).
207. No. 1699-N, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 2006). As described
below, the interlocutory opinion defended the original decision, but only by essentially
abandoning the reasoning of the first opinion in favor of an analysis that closely
resembles a theory of circumscribing bylaws. Id.
208. Id. at *4-6. Technically speaking, the agreement that formed the basis of the
contract was not obtained by shareholders, but rather by an organization called ASCI,
described by the court as “non-profit organization that advises Australian pension funds
on corporate governance.” UniSuper, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 205, at *3. It seems as if
ASCI was negotiating on behalf of its clients, who were institutional investors. More
importantly, the agreement it obtained allegedly bound the company to a course of
conduct, which of course applies to all shareholders equally. Id. Thus, the complaint
was filed by a group of institutional investors, not by ASCI. Id. at *12. In any event, the
court treated the agreement as one between institutional shareholders and the company,
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pill-redemption agreement (“PRA”), according to which the company
agreed not to implement a poison pill defense for longer than one year
without obtaining majority shareholder approval. Soon after
reincorporation, News Corp. was subject to a hostile bid; in response, it
adopted a poison pill, and one year later, the company extended the
pill’s duration without obtaining shareholder approval. In response to
litigation by shareholders seeking to enforce the original agreement, the
board argued that the PRA was illegal under § 141(a).209 The Chancellor
disagreed, and found the contract to be enforceable.210 His ruling meant
that the shareholders were able to prevent the board from implementing
a poison pill.
There is little reason to think that UniSuper would have been
decided differently had the PRA taken the form of a bylaw and not a
contract. Indeed, bylaws have a stronger claim to validity than contracts
like the PRA: whereas the latter can be implemented with only the
support of a small minority interest, bylaws require the assent of a
shareholder majority. To be sure, the PRA was a joint agreement
between (a few) shareholders and the board. Perhaps it might be
contended that the bilateral nature of the agreement put it on a different
footing than bylaws adopted unilaterally by shareholders. Such an
argument would run afoul of Quickturn, which established that the
board could not conjure a special ability to bind its future judgment
simply by embedding the restriction in a contract.211 It would be
without any regard to the difference—if any—between the identities of the plaintiffs
and the investors on whose behalf ASCI originally acted. See id. at *4-8.
209. UniSuper, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 205, at *23-26.
210. More specifically, enforceable to the extent that an actual contract had been
breached. The existence of any contract between the board and the shareholders was an
issue in dispute in the case. See UniSuper I-L, at *16-17. This uncertainty arose from
the fact that the agreement at issue was not formalized; rather, it was orally negotiated
behind closed doors, and then memorialized in a News Corp. press release to the public.
Id. at *17. The company claimed that it was bound only to adopt a board policy (which
it did), and the subsequent repeal of that policy breached no obligation. Id. Since the
opinion was issued in response to a motion to dismiss, the court accepted the plaintiffs’
allegations that the press release also promised the maintenance of that policy or, in the
alternative, that the board had agreed to do so in a separate oral contract. Id. at *16-17.
Since the court based its opinion on the assumption that a contract existed, the analysis
here will follow suit. See id. at *15-22.
211. See supra notes 175 & 176 and accompanying text. The contract in question in
Quickturn was the option contract that comprised the poison pill extended by the
company to its shareholders.
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senseless to waver from that rule just because the party negotiating the
contract is a shareholder minority. To the extent that the distinction
between contract and bylaw makes any difference, it should work in
favor of bylaw validity: the collective agreement of a shareholder
majority should have a greater claim to legitimacy than a policy effected
by a minority shareholder interest. If a restriction can be valid so long as
some shareholders negotiate for it, why require the shareholders’
participation in the first place? A board can always find a few
shareholders to sign on the dotted line in exchange for private benefits.
If this were to be sufficient, then the directors would in effect be
permitted to bind themselves.
On its own terms, UniSuper relied on reasoning that erred on
several basic points of law. While the outcome of the case was clear—
the Chancellor rejected the company’s argument that constraints on
board action necessarily violate § 141(a) whenever they limit, in any
fashion, the board’s discretion212—the original reasoning that supported
this conclusion cannot withstand serious analysis. Indeed, the first
UniSuper opinion reads like an outcome in search of a theory.213 This is
important because Chancellor Chandler would later revise his reasoning
in an opinion certifying an interlocutory appeal; the logic of that opinion
was (1) defensible on the merits and (2) not coincidentally, fully
consistent with BG. To fully appreciate the significance of his revisions,
it is useful to briefly review how his original opinion went wrong.
His first mistake was to disregard Delaware law on poison pills,
presumably unintentionally. He wrote:

212. The company also argued that the board’s decision to agree to the terms of the
contract violated its fiduciary duties. This argument is, strictly speaking, not relevant to
circumscribing bylaws, which do not require the board to agree and thus do not
implicate the board’s duties. Thus, only the § 141(a) argument is addressed here. That
said, the two arguments substantially overlap and the analysis of this section can be
applied to the fiduciary issue with only minor modifications.
213. UniSuper has its defenders, but the defenses support the point advanced here.
Professor Smith, for instance, has lauded UniSuper as an example of privately ordered
corporate governance, in which the allocation of power between board and shareholders
is determined on a firm-by-firm basis. See Smith, supra note 22, at 188 (concluding that
UniSuper “evinces the potential of private ordering to benefit shareholders in public
corporations”). In other words, like the Chancellor, he focuses on the outcome of the
case at the expense of its reasoning. His account of the case is indeed elegant; the point
made here is that the outcome can be reached only by means of a legal argument that
recognizes the general validity of circumscribing constraints on the board.
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The fact that the alleged contract in this case gives power to the
shareholders saves it from invalidation under Section 141(a). The
alleged contract with ACSI did not cede power over poison pills to
an outside group; rather, it ceded that power to shareholders. . . . .
[W]hen shareholders exercise their right to vote in order to assert
control over the business and affairs of the corporation the board
must give way. This is because the board’s power—which is that of
an agent’s with regard to its principal—derives from the
shareholders, who are the ultimate holders of power under Delaware
214
law.

Compare that passage with the following excerpt from the 2001
Delaware Supreme Court opinion in Account v. Hilton Hotels Corp.215
It is indisputable that Moran established a board’s authority to adopt
a rights plan. . . . Moran addressed a fundamental question of
corporate law in the context of takeovers: whether a board of
directors had the power to adopt unilaterally a rights plan the effect
of which was to interpose the board between the shareholders and
the proponents of a tender offer. The power recognized in Moran
would have been meaningless if the rights plan required shareholder
approval. Indeed, it is difficult to harmonize Moran’s basic holding
with a contention that questions a Board’s prerogative to
216
unilaterally establish a rights plan.

Hilton’s facts were not directly on point, but its reasoning should
have controlled.217 Poison pills cannot be used to elicit the best offer
price from a bidder if the shareholders can veto their use. The purpose of
a pill, after all, is to force the bidder to secure approval from the board,
which can negotiate to obtain the bidder’s best price.218 Shareholders, by
contrast, can only choose between tendering and not tendering. An
important justification for the pill is that it prevents shareholders from
choosing to tender so long as the price is acceptable even though it

214.
215.
216.
217.

UniSuper, at *24-26.
780 A.2d 245, 249 (Del. 2001).
Id. (emphasis added).
In Hilton, individual shareholders were seeking to opt out of the pill
unilaterally, rather than putting the pill itself to a shareholder vote.
218. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
1037, 1057 n.77 & 1057-58 (2002) (noting that poison pill operates to the benefit of
shareholders when it forces potential acquirers to raise their bids in order to convince
the target board to endorse the offer and dismantle the pill).
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might not be the maximal price they could obtain.219 The board’s
leverage to bargain for that maximal price disappears if the shareholders
can lower (or, in the case of the PRA, choose not to raise) the defenses,
since the shareholders might do so in response to any minimally
acceptable bid. Whatever the merits of this reasoning, it has consistently
been Delaware law for many years, as the Chancellor himself would
later acknowledge in his final Airgas opinion.220
In light of this settled precedent, one might have expected the
Chancellor to distinguish UniSuper on its facts. Instead, he tried to
evade Hilton’s command with his excursion into agency theory,
excerpted above.221 This approach to the case could never have worked,
because directors, simply put, are not agents of the shareholders. To be
sure, many scholars use agency theory to provide a compelling
normative theory of the nature of the corporation and a useful positive
description of the board’s fiduciary duties.222 Agency theory, however,
cannot be a complete or fully accurate account of the relationship
between shareholders and director, because the corporate law departs
from agency law on a number of important issues, such as the
distribution of capital223 and the board’s unilateral ability to deploy a
poison pill.224 In any event, Hilton itself had specifically rejected an

219.
220.

Id. at 1041-42.
See Air Prods. & Chems, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 57-58 (Del. Ch.
2011) (stating the Chancellor’s “personal view [that]Airgas’s poison pill has served its
legitimate purpose” but admitting that he was bound by precedent that “selection of a
time frame for achievement of corporate goals . . . may not be delegated to the
stockholders.”).
221. See UniSuper, Ltd v. News Corp, No. 1699-N, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 205, *33
(Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2005) (asserting that “[w]here the principal [the shareholders] makes
known to the agent [the board] exactly which actions the principal wishes to be taken,
the agent must act in accordance with those instructions”). See also supra note 214 and
accompanying text.
222. The most famous work expounding this view was the seminal paper: Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981).
223. See Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on
Why Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
667, 677 (2003) (noting that it is “difficult to reconcile” the view that directors are
shareholders’ agents with the “fundamental reality of corporate law” that shareholders
can neither pay themselves dividends nor force the board to do so).
224. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying
and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 909
(2003) (noting that “poison pills are adopted unilaterally by the board of directors” and
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agency-based view of the board’s power, which makes the Chancellor’s
decision to rely on that normative argument all the more puzzling.
By appealing to agency theory, the Chancellor overlooked a useful,
readily available factual distinction. Hilton had addressed the board’s
power to deploy a pill;225 the issue presented in UniSuper was the
indispensability of that power. While the former question has, as noted
above, been engaged frequently by the Delaware courts, the latter
question has never been decided. Never has the Court required the board
to deploy a pill, nor has it held that the board’s power to deploy a pill
cannot be compromised.226 Moreover, News Corp. could not force a
merits consideration of the indispensability issue, because it was not yet
ripe on the facts of the case presented to the court. After all, the
measures that the company retained under the PRA227 might have been
sufficient to fend off hostile bids. In the absence of an actual hostile bid,
the court would have neither the occasion nor the means to determine
whether the board actually needed the pill to fulfill its fiduciary duties.
Had the case been framed this way, existing precedent would have
supported the Chancellor’s position. The Chancellor could have reached
the same result—i.e. rejecting the company’s motion to dismiss—

that “the fact that the pill did not require shareholder approval was one of its main
attractions”).
225. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
226. Indeed, the Court has implied that the board’s power to redeem a pill can be
altered in the certificate. See Carmody v. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d 1180, 1191 (Del. 1997)
(holding that because “the Rights Plan’s allocation of voting power to redeem the
Rights is nowhere found in the Toll Brothers certificate of incorporation, the complaint
states a claim that the ‘dead hand’ feature of the Rights Plan is . . . statutorily invalid
under Delaware law”). It would be bizarre if the power to implement a pill could not be
similarly altered in the certificate.
227. For instance, a staggered board is, in itself, an impediment to a hostile
takeover, since it would still take the bidder two election cycles to obtain majority
representation on the board. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k)(1) (providing that
directors on staggered boards can be removed only “for cause.”). So too do target firms
enjoy the protections of § 203, which prevents a 15% holder of a target company’s
stock from merging with the target for three years, unless it obtains board approval
before becoming a 15% holder, acquires 85% of the outstanding stock in its tender
offer, or receives the approval of a supermajority of minority stockholders. Neither of
the last two conditions is trivial, which alone incentivizes acquirers to negotiate friendly
transactions instead of proceeding with a hostile tender offer. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 203(a)(2).
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without contradicting controlling precedent or relying on ill-considered
theories about gap-filling in corporate contracts.228
Ultimately, the Chancellor came to embrace this factual distinction
in UniSuper I-L, when he reconsidered and restated his original
UniSuper argument. Some commentators have characterized UniSuper
I-L as a “clarification” of the original opinion,229 but, in fact, it
thoroughly recast the underlying legal analysis. Agency law was
completely absent from the discussion of § 141(a), replaced by the
following justification for the contract’s enforceability:
The fact (if it is a fact) that the News Corp. board agreed to cede part
of its authority over a discrete question (extension of the Company’s
poison pill) to the Company’s owners (the shareholders at
230
large) . . . .

In the context of the case, this sentence is highly significant. It
shows that the reasoning of the original UniSuper had been abandoned.
A new argument—that the PRA was valid because it so minimally
interfered with the directors’ overall authority—had become central to
the case holding. The original UniSuper opinion did not even consider
the extent of the board’s cessation of power, and implied that the board
could have relinquished any amount of its control, so long as it was
228. In particular, the Chancellor’s statement that “[s]hareholders should be
permitted to fill a particular gap in the corporate contract if they wish to fill it” so
wholly contradicts basic tenets of Delaware law that one supposes he could not really
have meant what he wrote. Not even the most ardent proponent of an agency model of
the corporation would endorse this statement as an accurate description of the law. For
example, shareholders cannot fill the gaps in the corporate contract by deciding to
indemnify directors against liability for bad faith actions. See, e.g., Waltuch v.
ContiCommodity Servs, Inc., 88 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1996). Nor can they expand the scope
or strictness of the directors’ fiduciary duties. It has never been suggested to or by a
Delaware court, for instance, that shareholders can alter the duty of loyalty so that
directors are required to present corporate opportunities to the board before taking
them. See, e.g., Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 157 (Del. 1996)
(holding that “if [a] director or officer believes . . . that the corporation is not entitled to
the opportunity, then he may take it for himself” and reiterating that “[i]t is not the law
of Delaware that presentation to the board is a necessary prerequisite to a finding that a
corporate opportunity has not been usurped”). Perhaps such a thing could be done in
the certificate, but of course, the certificate is itself the contract, not a gap-filling
measure, and it cannot be modified by the shareholders.
229. See, e.g., Frederick Alexander & James Honaker, Power to the Franchise or
the Fiduciaries: An Analysis of the Limits on Stockholder Activist Bylaws, 33 DEL. J.
CORP. LAW 749, 756 n.24 (2008).
230. UniSuper I-L, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 11, at *10 (emphasis added).
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relinquished to the shareholders. By contrast, UniSuper I-L treated the
narrowness of the board restriction (and by implication, the retention by
the board of most of its authority) as the dispositive factor.
This renewed focus on the extent to which the board’s power had
actually been compromised was ultimately an endorsement of the theory
of circumscribing bylaws. It was this theory that was presented to the
Court by the certification order, and thus this theory that the court
implicitly blessed by declining to hear the interlocutory appeal. The
Court’s only response to UniSuper I-L was a brief order noting that,
even though it “generally . . . gives substantial deference to the trial
judge’s recommendation” on interlocutory appeals, “the interests of
justice are best served if these proceedings are not interrupted by an
interlocutory appeal.”231 Had the Court disapproved of UniSuper, CA
gave it a ready opportunity to cabin it to its facts—for instance, by
observing that the PRA was an example of a substantive issue unsuitable
for bylaw inclusion. Admittedly, only the weakest of inferences can be
drawn from the Court’s decision not to include dicta criticizing
UniSuper in a subsequent case.232 Still, what limited evidence that we
have points to a judicial acceptance of the circumscribing bylaw theory.
In summary, if UniSuper I-L remains the last word on the issue of
the validity of shareholder agreements that bind the board, it would
seem to weigh in favor of a legal principle under which circumscribing
bylaws would also be valid.
CONCLUSION: BG AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
This Article has set forth two interrelated arguments. One lies in the
sphere of positive law, and contends that shareholders in fact have more
power to enforce substantive bylaws against the board than is commonly
assumed. While they cannot control the board, they may circumscribe its
authority. The other, more normative argument concerns the
implications of that doctrine of bylaw validity for corporate governance.
231. News Corp. v. UniSuper Ltd., 906 A.2d 138, 139 (Del. 2006). Notably,
Professors Hu and Westbrook observe that the Court’s decision not to hear the appeal
came as “much surprise to the bar.” See Henry T. C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook,
Abolition of the Corporate Duty to Creditors, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1389 (2007).
232. It did, after all, describe hypothetical bylaw provisions that would be
considered procedural even though they had substantive ramifications. It could have
also described, by means of contrast, a bylaw provision that would in fact be considered
substantive.
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The normative argument cannot be fully appreciated until the issues
of positive law are fully resolved. As argued in Part II, the Delaware
bylaw case law is messy. The CA case purports to articulate a test for
bylaw validity, but the test is wholly inadequate. It is based on a
distinction between types of bylaws that is both incoherent and
incomplete; it exists in significant tension with prior precedent; its
exposition relies on far-fetched hypotheticals; and it is not even
consistent with the outcome of the case. The Court must revisit the
issue. This Article suggests how it might re-articulate the doctrine
consistent with both the spirit of CA and the holdings of prior case law.
This revision turns on the distinction between circumscribing and
controlling bylaws, and would hold that the former are presumptively
valid, whereas the latter are definitively invalid.

